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Article
Counsel and Confrontation
Todd E. Pettyst
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently declared that,
when interpreting the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause,' it will ascribe decisive weight to the English common
law as it existed in the states at the time of the Sixth Amend-
ment's ratification in 1791.2 Drawing heavily on those common
law sources, the Court has held that the Confrontation Clause
forbids the admission of "testimonial"3 hearsay statements
against a criminal defendant, unless the person who uttered
those statements appears for cross-examination at trial.4 The
Court has further explained that the English common law in
1791 recognized-and the Sixth Amendment thus incorpo-
rates-an overarching exception to that rule: a witness's testi-
t Professor of Law and Bouma Fellow in Trial Law, University of Iowa
College of Law. Copyright 0 2009 by Todd E. Pettys.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .....
2. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-69 (2004) (equating the
Confrontation Clause with the English common law rules governing the con-
frontation of witnesses in the late eighteenth century and rejecting a line of
nonconforming Supreme Court precedent); see also Giles v. California, 128 S.
Ct. 2678, 2682-83 (2008) (framing the Court's Confrontation Clause analysis
by identifying two classes of cases in which the English common law in the
eighteenth century permitted the admission of unconfronted testimonial
statements); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824-26 (2006) (drawing from
founding-era cases to identify the features of "testimonial" statements).
3. A person makes a "testimonial" statement if he or she makes the
statement under circumstances that "objectively indicate" the purpose of the
statement is not to seek assistance in an ongoing emergency, but rather "to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu-
tion." Davis. 547 U.S. at 822.
4. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 (articulating this rule); see also id. at
60 n.9 ("[W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his
prior testimonial statements.").
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monial hearsay statements may be admitted into evidence even
if the witness does not appear at trial, so long as the defendant
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness prior to trial
and the witness has since died or is otherwise unavailable to
testify.5 This Article focuses on that overarching exception and
argues that, by tethering the Confrontation Clause to eigh-
teenth-century common law authorities, the Court has laid the
groundwork for a startling conclusion. A defendant's pretrial
cross-examination of a witness who later becomes unavailable
to testify is sufficient to vindicate the defendant's rights under
the Confrontation Clause, even if the defendant must interro-
gate the witness on his or her own, without the aid of an attor-
ney.
In its 2004 watershed ruling in Crawford v. Washington,
the Court held that the Confrontation Clause embodies the cen-
turies-old Anglo-American view that adversarial cross-
examination is the best means of testing the reliability of a
witness's testimony.6 The Court thus abandoned the approach
it had taken a quarter of a century earlier in Ohio v. Roberts,7
under which an absent witness's hearsay statements could be
offered against a criminal defendant-even though the defen-
dant never had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness-if
the trial judge concluded that the statements bore sufficient
"indicia of reliability."8 The Crawford Court found that, by
5. See id. at 54 ("[The common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of
an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to
cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limita-
tions."). The Court has emphasized that the Sixth Amendment permits an ex-
ception to the ban on testimonial hearsay only if that exception was already in
place "at the time of the founding." Id. In addition to the exception noted
above, the Court has acknowledged two others that were securely in place in
1791. See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2683-84 (identifying an eighteenth-century ex-
ception for instances when a criminal defendant-acting with the intent to
prevent a particular witness from testifying--caused the witness's absence
from the trial); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (observing that the existence of
an exception for "dying declarations" in the late eighteenth century "cannot be
disputed," but reserving judgment on whether the Sixth Amendment incorpo-
rates that exception).
6. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-54 (examining English and American
authorities).
7. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-68 (criti-
quing and rejecting the Roberts framework).
8. Id. at 66 (holding that when a declarant is not available to testify at
trial, his or her hearsay statement may nevertheless be admitted into evidence
"if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability,"' and explaining that a statement
bears such indicia if it either "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception"
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1791, authorities both in England and in the United States had
concluded that judicial assessments of hearsay statements' re-
liability were no substitute for the rigors of cross-examination:
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at
odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate
goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be re-
liable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by test-
ing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point
on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can
best be determined.9
The Court declared that testimonial hearsay statements are
inadmissible against a criminal defendant unless the defendant
has been given an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
either at or prior to trial.10
When discussing the constitutional sufficiency of pretrial
opportunities to cross-examine witnesses, neither Crawford nor
its emerging progeny directly address the question of whether
such opportunities satisfy the Confrontation Clause if the de-
fendant has to conduct that cross-examination on his or her
own, without the assistance of counsel. If a defendant is unac-
companied by an attorney but is nevertheless given a chance to
cross-examine an adverse witness, does the Confrontation
Clause permit the admission of that witness's testimonial
statements into evidence at trial if the witness has since be-
come unavailable to testify?
One need not look far to find scenarios in which that issue
arises. Consider, for example, the facts that were recently pre-
sented to the Court in Davis v. Washington." Responding to a
report of a domestic disturbance, two police officers arrived at
the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon.12 The police separated
Hershel and Amy and questioned them in different areas-
Hershel in the kitchen, and Amy first outside, and then in the
living room.13 During that period of interrogation, Amy told the
or was made under circumstances marked by "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness").
9. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
10. See id. at 62 ("Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is ob-
viously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is ob-
viously guilty.").
11. 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (issuing a consolidated opinion for both Davis v.
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana).
12. See id. at 819.
13. See id.
2009]1 203
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
officers that Hershel had attacked her. 14 The Court noted that
"Hershel made several attempts to participate in Amy's conver-
sation with the police, but was rebuffed." 5 When the officers
refused to allow Hershel to join their conversation with Amy he
became angry, but the officers insisted that Amy be questioned
in private.16 The Court recited these facts in its written opinion
because they lent weight to the determination that Amy's
statements were testimonial in nature. 7 Because the officers
had the two individuals well under control, the Court reasoned,
Amy's statements were not made for the purpose of helping the
police respond to an ongoing emergency, but rather were made
to help establish facts that might later prove relevant in a crim-
inal prosecution.' 8 Because Amy eventually refused to testify at
trial, and because Hershel never had an opportunity to cross-
examine Amy at any point along the way, the Court held that
the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of Amy's state-
ments to the police.19
Suppose, however, that the police had acceded to Hershel's
demands and-while continuing to maintain control of the sit-
uation-had allowed Hershel to be present while Amy respond-
ed to the officers' questions. Indeed, suppose the police had ac-
ceded to Herschel's demands precisely because they feared that
Amy might refuse to testify against her husband by the time
his trial date arrived. By giving Hershel a chance to question
Amy at the scene of the alleged crime, could they have ensured
that her statements to the police would be admissible at trial?
Would that opportunity to cross-examine Amy have been suffi-
cient to satisfy Hershel's rights under the Confrontation
Clause?
The facts in Crawford can easily be modified to raise the
same question. Police officers separately questioned Michael
and Sylvia Crawford at the stationhouse concerning an alleged
14. See id. at 820.
15. Id. at 819-20 (citation omitted).
16. See id. at 820.
17. See id. at 829-30; see also supra note 3 (defining "testimonial" state-
ments).
18. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 829 ("It is entirely clear from the circumstances
that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possible criminal past
conduct . . . . There was no emergency in progress . . . ."); id. at 830 (noting
that Amy had been "actively separated from the defendant -officers forcibly
prevented Hershel from participating in the interrogation").
19. See id. at 829-34 (summarizing the Court's reasoning).
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assault.20 Sylvia's statements to the police tended to incrimi-
nate her husband, but she refused to testify against him at tri-
al.2 1 The trial court admitted Sylvia's statements into evidence,
and the jury found Michael guilty of assault.22 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Michael had been deprived of an
opportunity to cross-examine his wife.23 Suppose, however, that
the police had given Michael a pro se opportunity to question
Sylvia at the stationhouse, fearing that Sylvia would eventual-
ly refuse to testify against her husband and wishing to ensure
that her statements would nevertheless be admissible. Would
that opportunity have been sufficient to vindicate Michael's
rights under the Confrontation Clause, when Sylvia did indeed
later refuse to testify?
Our instincts today might quickly tell us that the question
is an easy one, and that, unless a person has waived his or her
right to an attorney's assistance, pro se opportunities to cross-
examine witnesses are plainly insufficient. If the Confrontation
Clause's primary concern is ensuring that testimonial state-
ments are tested "in the crucible of cross-examinatio*n," 2 4 then
we might reason that a cross-examination opportunity is con-
stitutionally adequate only if it is offered to a defendant who is
assisted by someone trained in the law and in the art of ex-
amining witnesses. Indeed, we might even believe that those
instincts are safely vindicated by a Supreme Court decision
handed down nearly half a century ago.
In Pointer v. Texas,25 decided in 1965, Bob Pointer was ar-
rested on suspicion of robbery and was brought before a state
judge for a pre-indictment hearing at which Pointer was unre-
presented by counsel. 26 The prosecuting attorney called and
questioned witnesses, including Kenneth Phillips, the alleged
victim, but Pointer declined to direct any questions of his own
to Phillips. 27 When Phillips proved to be unavailable to testify
at trial, the presiding judge permitted the transcript of Phillips'
20. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004) (discussing the
police's questioning of the couple); State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash.
2002) (en banc) (explicitly stating that the police "questioned the Crawfords
independently"), rev'd, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 39-40.
22. See id. at 40-41.
23. See id. at 65-69.
24. Id. at 61.
25. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
26. See id. at 401.
27. See id.
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earlier testimony to be read to the jury, concluding that Pointer
had been given an opportunity to cross-examine Phillips and
had declined to take advantage of it.28 Rejecting that line of
reasoning, the Supreme Court held that, "[bjecause the tran-
script of Phillips' statement . .. had not been taken at a time
and under circumstances affording petitioner through counsel
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Phillips," the Con-
frontation Clause barred the admission of the transcript.29
This Article argues that Crawford's recent refocusing of the
Court's confrontation jurisprudence provides strong reason to
believe that pro se opportunities to cross-examine witnesses
prior to trial are indeed now sufficient to satisfy the Confronta-
tion Clause's requirements when those witnesses later become
unavailable to testify. To the extent they are inconsistent with
that conclusion, Pointer and its progeny are thus poised to join
Ohio v. Roberts among the ranks of cases judged to be unwar-
ranted deviations from the nation's founding-era convictions
about criminal defendants' right to confront the witnesses
against them. Approaching the issue from the vantage point of
one who believes that the loss of Pointer would be deeply la-
mentable but that Crawford's mode of analysis is not a mere
passing fancy, the Article examines other constitutional provi-
sions to determine whether they might ameliorate the Confron-
tation Clause's shortcomings. The Article argues that, in cer-
tain circumstances, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process will
guarantee defendants an attorney's aid when cross-examining
28. See id. at 401-02.
29. Id. at 407 (emphasis added); see also id. ('The case before us would be
quite a different one had Phillips' statement been taken at a full-fledged hear-
ing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a
complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine."). The Court mirrored
this reasoning five years later in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970),
another case involving testimony given at a preliminary hearing, though this
time the defendant was represented by counsel. Id. at 151. The defendant's
attorney extensively cross-examined the witness. See id. When the witness,
Melvin Porter, refused to cooperate at trial, the trial court read into evidence
portions of the transcript of Porter's testimony. See id. at 152. The Court ruled
that the admission of the transcript did not violate the Confrontation Clause:
Porter's statement at the preliminary hearing had already been
given under circumstances closely approximating those that surround
the typical trial. Porter was under oath; respondent was represented
by counsel-the same counsel in fact who later represented him at
trial; respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter as to
his statement; and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial
tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of the hearings.
Id. at 165.
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witnesses prior to trial. In other instances, however, the Con-
stitution leaves unrepresented defendants responsible for cross-
examining witnesses on their own.
Part I examines the early English and American common
law authorities on which Crawford instructs us to rely when in-
terpreting the Confrontation Clause. It argues that, at the time
of the Confrontation Clause's ratification in 1791, authorities
both in England and in the United States held that affording
an unrepresented defendant a pretrial opportunity to cross-
examine a hearsay declarant was sufficient to pave the way for
admitting that declarant's statements into evidence if he or she
later died or became otherwise unavailable to testify at trial.
Part II examines the Court's Sixth Amendment right-to-
counsel jurisprudence. If authorities offer a suspect a pretrial
opportunity to cross-examine a hearsay declarant after the sus-
pect's right to counsel has attached, the suspect is constitution-
ally entitled to rely upon an attorney to conduct the cross-
examination. But if the cross-examination opportunity is af-
forded to an unrepresented suspect before his or her right to
counsel has attached, and if the witness has already become
unavailable to testify by the time attachment does occur, the
Sixth Amendment poses no obstacle to admitting the witness's
hearsay statements into evidence at trial.
Part III examines the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth AmendmentS30 to determine whether they might
fill the gaps left by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation and
Right to Counsel Clauses. In matters of criminal procedure, the
Due Process Clauses' free-standing significance is quite narrow.
The Court has said that most matters of criminal procedure are
to be adjudicated under the particular provisions of the Bill of
Rights that specifically address the matter at issue (such as, in
our case, the Sixth Amendment's provisions concerning the con-
frontation of witnesses and the assistance of counsel). The
Court does, however, permit judges to examine historical and
contemporary Anglo-American materials in order to identify
any procedural requirements that, although not prescribed by a
more specific constitutional provision, are nevertheless deeply
rooted in our traditions and in our historically grounded sense
of fundamental fairness. Examining Anglo-American materials
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, li-
berty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."); id. amend. XIV ("No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ).
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ranging from the founding era to England's recent efforts to
bring its laws into alignment with the European Convention on
Human Rights, Part III concludes that there is a surprisingly
robust body of evidence indicating that, in many cases, it would
not violate the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to permit a jury
to rely upon the hearsay statements of an unavailable witness
whom only the unrepresented defendant was given a pretrial
opportunity to cross-examine.
This Article concludes with a summary of the new constitu-
tional landscape and with the suggestion that legislative
reform may now be appropriate to ameliorate that landscape's
deficiencies.
I. THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT HEARSAY DECLARANTS IN
EARLY ENGLISH AND AMERICAN HISTORY
The Court today insists that criminal defendants' Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights be equated with those that ex-
isted under the English common law as it was received in the
United States at the time of the Confrontation Clause's ratifi-
cation. 31 Both in England and in the United States, authorities
in the late eighteenth century concluded that affording an un-
represented defendant a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine
a hearsay declarant was sufficient to permit admitting that
declarant's testimonial statements into evidence if he or she be-
came unavailable to testify at trial.32
A. COUNSEL AND CONFRONTATION UNDER THE ENGLISH
COMMON LAW
To tell the story of English defendants' confrontation rights
in the late eighteenth century, one may begin two centuries
earlier under the reign of Queen Mary, when Parliament
enacted a pair of bail and committal statutes concerning pre-
liminary hearings held before justices of the peace.33 In Eng-
31. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (noting this development).
32. Authorities' insistence upon giving defendants an opportunity to con-
front adverse witnesses was not, however, invariable. See Giles v. California,
128 S. Ct. 2678, 2682-83 (2008) (identifying two eighteenth-century exceptions
to the usual requirement of confrontation).
33. See An Act to Take Examination of Prisoners Suspected of Any Man-
slaughter or Felony, 1555, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (Eng.); An Act Touching
Bailment of Persons, 1554, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (Eng.). Of course, the notion
of a right to confront adverse witnesses extends back much further. See Frank
R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
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land at that time, a justice of the peace had only two options
when an accused felon was brought before him: pending trial,
he could either release the suspect on bail or commit the sus-
pect to prison.34 Parliament grew concerned that justices of the
peace were sometimes colluding with dangerous suspects by re-
leasing them on bail, only to have them disappear and escape
punishment entirely, "to the high displeasure of Almighty God,
the great peril of the King and Queen's true subjects, and en-
couragement of all thieves and evil-doers."35 To curb that prob-
lem, Parliament declared in 1554 that, before a justice of the
peace could order an accused felon released on bail, he had to
interrogate the suspect and the witnesses who had hauled the
suspect in, and then make a written record of what the suspect
and witnesses had said regarding "the fact[s] and circums-
tances" of the alleged crime. 36 That way, Parliament reasoned,
the justices' supervising authorities would have a basis for de-
termining whether a justice ought to be punished for inappro-
priately releasing a dangerous suspect on bail, should the sus-
pect fail to appear for trial. 37
The following year, Parliament extended the justices' in-
terrogation and documentation duties to all cases in which ac-
cused felons were brought before them.38 It is not clear why
Parliament imposed those duties in cases where accused felons
were committed to prison pending trial, and where collusive
bailing thus was not a concern. John Langbein posits that the
statute marked an early effort to prod justices of the peace to
assume the role of public prosecutors, 39 while others hypothes-
ize that Parliament hoped trial juries would rely upon the jus-
tices' written records as evidence. 40 Regardless of Parliament's
intentions, courts and others eventually did come to appreciate
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 482 (1994) (trac-
ing the right to ancient Roman law).
34. See 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 233 (London, MacMillan 1883). Justices of the peace had greater
powers when dealing with persons accused of misdemeanors, including the
power to preside over a jury trial or, in some instances, to adjudicate the case
on their own. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAIS-
SANCE 66, 75 (1974).
35. An Act Touching Bailment of Persons § 1.
36. Id. § 4.
37. See LANGBEIN, supra note 34, at 11.
38. See An Act to Take Examination of Prisoners Suspected of Any Man-
slaughter or Felony § 2.
39. See LANGBEIN, supra note 34, at 24.
40. See id. at 21-22.
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the potential evidentiary value of pretrial interrogations con-
ducted by justices of the peace and others. William Holdsworth
reports that by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centu-
ries, depositions taken by justices of the peace, trial judges, and
other public officials frequently were admitted into evidence
against criminal defendants.41
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English
common law gradually responded to growing concerns regard-
ing juries' reliance upon pretrial depositions in lieu of live tes-
timony at trial. Those concerns were heightened by the fact
that, in many instances, the depositions were given ex parte,
with no opportunity for the defendants to cross-examine the
deponents. 42 English authorities responded in two primary
ways. First, they began to move toward a rule of unavailability,
admitting hearsay statements in lieu of live testimony only if
the witness was unavailable to attend the trial.43 While prepar-
ing to try their peer Lord Morley on charges of murder in
1666,44 for example, the House of Lords declared that deposi-
tions taken by the coroner could be read into evidence only if
the witnesses "were dead, or unable to travel," or absent "by the
means or procurement of the prisoner."45 If the prosecutors
merely reported that they had "used all their endeavours to
find" a deponent and did not know where he or she was, the
41. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 218 (1926).
42. The most infamous such instance, of course, is Raleigh's Case, 2 How.
St. Tr. 1 (1603), in which Sir Walter Raleigh was convicted of treason-and
eventually beheaded-on the strength of Lord Cobham's ex parte written ac-
cusations. See generally 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 389-99 (1847)
(describing the political intrigue surrounding the treason accusations leveled
against Raleigh).
43. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 218 (tracing the origins of the
unavailability requirement to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centu-
ries); see also 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
592 (London, 8th ed. 1894) (observing that it "seems agreed" that depositions
taken by justices of the peace pursuant to the 1554 and 1555 statutes are ad-
missible if the witness "is dead, or unable to travel, or kept away by the means
or procurement of the prisoner" (citations omitted)); THOMAS PEAKE, A COM-
PENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 61-62 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1812) (writ-
ing that, when a witness is living and can "be found," his or her deposition is
inadmissible); 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 21 (3d ed. 1940)
(stating that, by the mid-1600s, a consensus was emerging in both civil and
criminal cases in England "that even an extra-judicial statement under oath
should not be used if the deponent can be personally had in court").
44. Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 769 (H.L. 1666).
45. Id. at 770-71.
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Lords would refuse to consider the witness's hearsay state-
ments. 46
Second, English courts constructed the common law rule
that a witness's hearsay statements would be admissible at tri-
al only if they were made in the defendant's presence and the
defendant had been given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. In the 1696 case of King v. Paine,47 for example, a wit-
ness gave a deposition before the town mayor, accusing Samuel
Paine of libel.4 8 Although the witness died prior to trial and
thus met the rule of unavailability, the Court of King's Bench
ruled that the deposition "should not be given in evidence, the
defendant not being present when [it was] taken before the
mayor, and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination."49
Dying declarations were set aside by the English courts as the
only species of hearsay statement that could be admitted into
evidence even though the defendant was not present when the
statement was made and never was given a chance to cross-
examine the declarant.50
English authorities debated for a time whether the com-
mon law's insistence upon an opportunity to cross-examine
hearsay declarants applied even to statements made to justices
of the peace pursuant to the sixteenth-century bail and com-
mittal statutes.51 By the time the Americans were drafting and
ratifying the Sixth Amendment, however, English authorities
were answering the question in the affirmative.52 In the 1789
case of King v. Woodcock,53 for example, a justice of the peace
46. Id. at 771.
47. King v. Paine, (1696) 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B.).
48. See id. at 584.
49. Id. at 585.
50. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 105 (1951) (identifying dying declarations as the
English common law's only exception to the rule that, either prior to or at tri-
al, criminal defendants must be given an opportunity to cross-examine those
who testify against them).
51. See King v. Westbeer, (1739) 168 Eng. Rep. 108, 109 (K.B.) (reporting
that, at trial, the parties debated the admissibility of the unconfronted wit-
ness's statement and that the trial court admitted the statement with a cau-
tion to the jury that the evidence "would not be conclusive unless it were
strongly corroborated by other testimony," but declining to address the state-
ment's admissibility on appeal); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
46 (2004) (citing Westbeer and noting the debate); supra notes 33-41 and ac-
companying text (discussing the bail and committal statutes which required
justices to take witness statements).
52. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46.
53. King v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B.).
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took the deposition of Silvia Woodcock, who had been found
badly injured by the side of a road.54 Silvia gave a statement
implicating her husband William, who subsequently was
charged with murder after Silvia died from her injuries.55 The
trial judge instructed the jury that admissible evidence ordina-
rily consisted of testimony given "before the Jury, in the face of
the Court, in the presence of the prisoner, and received under
all the advantages which examination and cross-examination
can give."56 The judge explained that exceptions to that rule
were made for two kinds of pretrial statements: a "dying decla-
ration of a person who has received a fatal blow" and who be-
lieved he or she was about to die, and a statement made to a
magistrate or justice of the peace pursuant to the 1554 and
1555 bail and committal statutes.57 The judge told the jury
that, while Silvia's statement was admissible as a dying decla-
ration, it was doubtful that the latter exception applied because
Silvia had made the statement outside William's presence and
"the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of contradicting the
facts [her statement] contains."5 8
The same court reached the same conclusion on compara-
ble facts two years later in King v. Dingler.5 9 While receiving
care at a local infirmary prior to her death, Jane Dingler gave a
sworn deposition to a local magistrate accusing her husband
George of causing her injuries.60 At George's murder trial, the
court ruled that the deposition was inadmissible because it did
not qualify as a dying declaration and because George had not
been present when Jane made the statement, and so "he could
not have the benefit of cross-examination."61
The common law rules reflected in Woodcock and Dingler
continued to predominate after the turn of the century. In the
1817 case of Rex v. Smith,62 for example, two magistrates took
the deposition of Charles Stewart, who would later die from
54. See id. at 352.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 353.
58. Id.
59. King v. Dingler, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (K.B.).
60. See id. at 383.
61. See id. at 384.
62. CROWN CASES RESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION; AND DECIDED BY THE
TWELVE JUDGES OF ENGLAND, FROM THE YEAR 1799 TO THE YEAR 1824, at 339
(London 1825).
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various injuries he had suffered.63 Charles Smith-the man
who would be charged with Stewart's murder-was present
when the deposition was taken.64 At the conclusion of the depo-
sition, the magistrates asked Smith "whether he chose to put
any questions to the deceased; he did not ask any question, but
only said, 'God forgive you, Charles."'6 5 The trial court ruled
that the deposition transcript was admissible, and Smith was
convicted.66 The Twelve Judges of England upheld the ruling
on appeal.67
Nineteenth-century commentators confirmed the English
common law rule that hearsay statements were generally in-
admissible against a criminal defendant if they were made out-
side the defendant's presence with no opportunity for cross-
examination. Thomas Peake wrote in 1813, for example, that
an unavailable witness's deposition was admissible in a crimi-
nal trial only if it was given under oath and in the defendant's
presence, such that the witness was "liable to cross-
examination by the party against whom his deposition is of-
fered."68 Thomas Starkie observed that, to be admissible in a
criminal case, a hearsay statement must be made in the pres-
ence of the prisoner, since otherwise "he would lose the benefit
of cross-examination."69 Edmund Powell made the same point,
writing that, under the English common law, unavailable wit-
nesses' "depositions taken in the presence of a prisoner before a
magistrate, and signed by the latter, were generally evidence
against the prisoner on his trial if it appeared that he had had
an opportunity of cross-examining the witness."70
Conspicuously absent in all of these authorities' discus-
sions is any mention of the necessity of counsel's assistance
when cross-examining hearsay declarants prior to trial. That
absence will not come as a surprise to those familiar with the
63. See id.
64. See id. Though Smith was absent for the initial portion of the deposi-
tion, the magistrates readministered the oath to Stewart, "distinctly and slow-
ly" read the transcript that had been prepared thus far, and continued with
their questioning. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 340.
67. See id.
68. PEAKE, supra note 43, at 62.
69. 2 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,
AND DIGEST OF PROOFS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 277 (London, J.
& W.T. Clarke 2d ed. 1833).
70. EDMUND POWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 166 (Phil-
adelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858).
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history of criminal defendants' right to counsel under English
law. Parliament did not authorize those accused of felonies to
retain the full services of defense counsel even at trial until
1836.71 Prior to that date, Parliament had permitted full legal
representation only for those accused of treason or misdemea-
nors.72 Parliament left accused felons to their own devices,
based in part on the view that, in high-stakes felony cases, "it
was particularly important to restrain counsel from interfering
with the court's access to the accused as an informational re-
source."73 If felony defendants were not entitled to the assis-
tance of counsel at trial prior to 1836, they certainly were not
going to win the right to the assistance of counsel at the kinds
of pretrial investigative proceedings in which hearsay decla-
rants made their testimonial statements.
Admittedly, not all felony defendants were left to fend for
themselves prior to 1836. Acting on their own initiative, Eng-
lish judges in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
sometimes permitted felony defendants to hire counsel for li-
mited purposes. 74 When allowed by the court, defense counsel
in felony cases could examine and cross-examine witnesses at
trial and could make arguments about the law to the presiding
71. See An Act for Enabling Persons Indicted of Felony to Make Their De-
fence by Counsel or Attorney, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114 (Eng.) (establishing
that people charged with felonies can use attorneys at trial).
72. See An Act for Regulating of Trials in Cases of Treason and Misprision
of Treason, 1695, 7 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (Eng.) (authorizing representation by
counsel for only those charged with treason, and even going so far as to re-
quire the appointment of counsel for those treason defendants who were una-
ble to afford an attorney); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF AD-
VERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 36 (2003) (stating that, "[a]t least as far back as the
early decades of the seventeenth century," those charged with misdemeanors
were permitted to be represented by counsel, and that there are no accounts
from that era explaining why counsel was permitted to those charged with
misdemeanors but not to those charged with more serious crimes). Blackstone
was mystified by England's practice of denying counsel to those charged with
felonies. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND 349 (photo. reprint 1979) (1769) (asking what rationale could possibly
justify denying counsel to those facing the prospect of execution while permit-
ting legal representation for those charged with "every petty trespass"). In all
quotations from Blackstone and other early printed sources, modern s is subs-
tituted for an archaic J symbol.
73. LANGBEIN, supra note 72, at 39.
74. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at 349-50 (acknowledging that Eng-
lish judges sometimes allowed defendants to rely upon the assistance of coun-
sel for examining witnesses and arguing points of law, but arguing that "this
is a matter of too much importance to be left to the good pleasure of any
judge").
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judge, but counsel was not permitted to make arguments di-
rectly to the jury-defendants had to carry out that task on
their own.75 Finding their professional opportunities cabined,
English attorneys in the late eighteenth century came to see
cross-examination as the trial task for which they could provide
the most valuable assistance.76 Trial judges previously had as-
sumed the duty of helping defendants question adverse wit-
nesses, but their questions were often perfunctory.77 When
permitted to appear, defense counsel approached cross-
examination with far greater vigor, provoking "a good deal of
anxiety among those who had to face up to it in such a public
arena as the Old Bailey, the main criminal court of London
whose business was regularly reported for public consumption
in the Old Bailey Session Papers."78 Indeed, the perceived effec-
tiveness of counsel's cross-examinations helped launch the
hearsay rule to a position of even greater prominence, as de-
fense attorneys began to insist upon an opportunity to question
the prosecution's witnesses.79
Prior to Parliament's intervention in 1836, however, de-
fense counsel's participation in felony cases remained far from
the norm; the great majority of defendants. went before juries
75. See J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English
Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST.
REV. 221, 230-31 (1991) (stating that, between the 1730s and 1836, defense
counsel in felony cases were permitted to "examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses and to speak to rules of law," but were not permitted to speak directly
to the jury); see also LANGBEIN, supra note 72, at 5 (stating that "[t]he purpose
of this restriction was to maintain the pressure on the accused to speak about
the events in question, hence to continue to serve as an informational resource
for the court").
76. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 535
(1990) ("Because defense counsel's role was limited in other regards, it is not
surprising that barristers defending those accused of felonies focused their at-
tention on cross-examination, a mechanism that offered the broadest latitude
for the development of persuasive proof with a minimum of restrictions.").
77. See Beattie, supra note 75, at 233 ("Judges went out of their way on
occasion-before and after 1730-to cross-examine witnesses at length, espe-
cially when they suspected the evidence being given, or when they had some
other reason to discredit the witness. Judges were only occasionally moved to
engage in vigorous cross-examinations however.").
78. Id. at 234; see also 5 WIGMORE, supra note 43, at 26 (stating that, in
the mid-1700s, judges were under increasing pressure to permit "trained
counsel" to conduct cross-examinations at trial).
79. See Landsman, supra note 76, at 572 (stating that there was an effort
to avoid the "dangers of hearsay" by enforcing the rule).
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and fought for acquittals entirely on their own.80 For those de-
fendants who desired and could afford representation, the deci-
sion whether to permit counsel to appear was left entirely to
"the good pleasure" of the judge.81 Defendants who could not af-
ford an attorney were especially likely to be unrepresented at
trial, because it was not until Parliament's enactment of the
Poor Prisoners' Defence Act in 1903 that they were assured of
"legal aid in the preparation and conduct of [their] defence."82
And regardless of what an English judge might have said in the
late eighteenth century about a particular defendant's ability to
hire counsel for assistance at trial, neither Parliament nor the
courts ever even hinted that counsel's pretrial assistance with
the cross-examination of a witness was necessary in order to
render that witness's hearsay statements admissible if he or
she later became unavailable to testify.
Parliament made explicit the nonnecessity of counsel's as-
sistance during pretrial cross-examination of hearsay decla-
rants in legislation enacted in 1848 83 -legislation that our own
Supreme Court has said codified the prevailing common law
rules on the subject of prior opportunities to cross-examine
hearsay declarants. 84 In the Indictable Offenses Act,85 Parlia-
80. See LANGBEIN, supra note 72, at 170 n.302 (providing statistics, such
as the presence of "defense counsel in 12.8% of trials in the year 1782"); Beat-
tie, supra note 75, at 227 (providing a table of the percentages of cases with
counsel from 1740-1800); Landsman, supra note 76, at 533-34 (describing the
trend from "a very low level of legal participation" to a rapid change in the
1730s where the "number of appearances by counsel noted in the records
tripled twice in ten years").
81. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at 350.
82. Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903, 3 Edw. 7, c. 38, § 1 (Eng.). Even
under the 1903 Act, however, the appointment of counsel was not guaranteed
since the presiding judge had to make a preliminary finding that the appoint-
ment of counsel would be "in the interests of justice." Id.; see also Norman
Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the Need
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 861-62 (2004) (discussing the limits of
the 1903 Act, such as inadequate attorney payments and the "interest of jus-
tice" standard).
83. See An Act to Facilitate the Performance of the Duties of Justices of
the Peace out of the Sessions within England and Wales with Respect to Per-
sons Charged with Indictable Offenses, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 17 (Eng.)
[hereinafter Indictable Offenses Act] (dealing with the defendant's right to
cross-examination).
84. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 47 (2004) (stating that the
statute codified the common law recognition that defendants need an opportu-
nity to cross-examine witnesses); see also R v. Beeston, (1854) 29 Eng. L. & Eq.
R. 527, 529 (Ct. Crim. App.) (Jervis, C.J.) (noting that the 1848 legislation "in-
troduced in terms the principle that the prisoner should have the full opportu-
nity of cross-examination, which he formerly had only by the equitable con-
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ment returned to the territory it had covered three centuries
earlier in the bail and committal statutes.86 Parliament de-
clared that, when a person "charged with any indictable Of-
fence" was brought before a justice of the peace, the justice
"shall, in the presence of such accused person, who shall be at
liberty to put questions to any witness produced against him,
take the statement . .. on oath or affirmation of those who shall
know the facts and circumstances of the case."87 Parliament
then codified the common law rule that, if such a witness later
died or became too ill to travel, the deposition could be read in-
to evidence if it were "proved that such deposition was taken in
the presence of the person so accused, and that he or his coun-
sel or attorney had a full opportunity of cross-examining the
witness."88
With respect to all cases in which the prosecution wished
to rely upon an unavailable witness's hearsay statements, Par-
liament's use of the tiny word "or" in the italicized phrase re-
flected the conclusion that the English common law had long
since reached: pretrial cross-examinations conducted by unre-
presented criminal defendants were sufficient to vindicate
those defendants' confrontation rights. If a defendant had the
good fortune of being represented by counsel at a proceeding in
which a witness's deposition was being taken, the defendant
could rely upon the attorney to interrogate the witness.89 But if
the defendant was unrepresented, the witness's statements
would be admissible at trial if he or she became unavailable to
struction of the law"); JOHN JERVIS, ARCHBOLD'S PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES 209-10 (London, Sweet, Stevens & Norton 12th ed. 1853)
(stating that, with respect to the prior cross-examination of hearsay decla-
rants, the Indictable Offenses Act simply codified the common law rules).
85. See Indictable Offenses Act, supra note 83, § 17.
86. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing the 1554
and 1555 bail and committal statutes).
87. Indictable Offenses Act, supra note 83, § 17.
88. Id. (emphasis added); cf. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COM-
MON LAW OF ENGLAND 345 (London, 6th ed. 1820) (drawing no distinction be-
tween questioning by "parties[] or their counsel or attornies" when asserting
that cross-examination "beats and boults out the truth much better, than
when the witness only delivers a formal series of his knowledge, without being
interrogated"(footnote omitted)).
89. See THOMAS WILLIAM SAUNDERS, THE PRACTICE OF MAGISTRATES'
COURTS 219-20 (Horace Cox 6th ed. 1902) ("[Under the Indictable Offenses
Act] the accused should be informed by the Bench that he may put any ques-
tions touching the matter he thinks proper. If the party charged has the assis-
tance of a professional adviser, such adviser should be permitted to conduct
the cross-examination .... ).
2009] 217
218 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:201
testify, so long as the official taking the deposition afforded the
defendant an opportunity to interrogate the witness on his or
her own. 90
B. COUNSEL AND CONFRONTATION IN EARLY AMERICA
Although Americans in the late eighteenth century rejected
a portion of their English legal heritage when they granted all
criminal defendants the right to hire an attorney to provide as-
sistance at trial,91 they adopted virtually wholesale England's
common law rules regarding confrontation and the admissibili-
ty of unavailable witnesses' hearsay statements. 92 Like their
predecessors in England, the early Americans deemed testi-
monial hearsay statements admissible, so long as the state-
ments were made in the defendant's presence and the defen-
dant was given an opportunity--even if unrepresented by
counsel-to cross-examine the witness.
Because federal courts were not frequently called upon to
adjudicate confrontation claims until much later in the nation's
history-after federal crimes had begun to grow in number 93
90. See EDMUND POWELL, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 303 (London, John Crockford 2d ed. 1859) (stating that, under the
Indictable Offenses Act, "when the prisoner is not attended by counsel or at-
torney, it ought also to appear that the magistrate had asked him whether he
would like to cross-examine, and that he had allowed the prisoner sufficient
time to consider what questions he would put"); see also R v. Peacock, (1870)
12 Cox Crim. Cas. 21, 22 (N. Cir.) (noting a common law presumption that if a
defendant is personally present at a deposition then he or she has been af-
forded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the deponent, but noting
that the presumption can be overcome, such as by evidence that the defendant
was not mentally fit to interrogate the witness); ROSCOE'S DIGEST OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES IN ENGLAND AND WALES
67 (Anthony Hawke ed., 15th ed. 1928) (citing Peacock and other authorities
for the proposition that "[t]here is a presumption that if defendant was present
he had a full opportunity of cross-examination, but it may be rebutted").
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.");
HELLER, supra note 50, at 109-10 (noting that the Sixth Amendment "af-
firmed the rejection by American practice of the English common law rule on
the subject"); see also WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERI-
CAN COURTS 18-21 (1955) (observing that the early state constitutions reflect-
ed a consensus that criminal defendants should be permitted to retain counsel,
but that most states in the founding era did not grant indigent defendants the
right to the appointment of counsel).
92. See generally U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him ..... .
93. Cf. Brandon L. Bigelow, Note, The Commerce Clause and Criminal
Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 913, 944 (2000) (stating that more than ninety percent of
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and after the Confrontation Clause had been held applicable to
the states94-one must rely primarily on state courts' rulings to
discern defendants' confrontation rights at the time of the na-
tion's founding. Those rulings indicate that, when American
prosecutors in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries sought to rely upon the hearsay statements of unavailable
witnesses, courts looked directly to the English common law for
guidance.95 In State v. Webb, 96 for example, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina held in 1794 that a witness's deposition could
not be used as evidence against the defendant in his trial for
horse stealing, because the defendant had not been present
when the deposition was taken.97 "[I]t is a rule of common law,
founded on natural justice," the court wrote, "that no man shall
be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross
examine."98
In Johnston v. State99-another case involving horse steal-
ing-the Supreme Court of Tennessee looked to the same com-
mon law authorities for direction when confronted with the
proffer of an unavailable witness's hearsay statements. 100 The
defendant and a witness had been brought to a justice of the
peace for questioning, where the witness gave a sworn state-
the nation's federal criminal statutes were enacted after 1909); Colin V. Ram,
Note, Regulating Intrastate Crime: How the Federal Kidnapping Act Blurs the
Distinction Between What Is Truly National and What Is Truly Local, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 774 (2008) (noting the increased demand for federal
criminal legislation as the twentieth century dawned because "criminal activi-
ty was no longer restrained within the bounds of state borders").
94. The Court did not hold that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
the Confrontation Clause until 1965. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
418 (1965) ("We decide today that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment is applicable to the States.").
95. See, e.g., 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 687 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed. 1872) (stating
that England's sixteenth-century bail and committal statutes and the common
law surrounding them "are early enough in date to be common law with us;
and they are regarded as such in Pennsylvania, in Maryland, and probably in
the other States generally"). The U.S. Supreme Court was still following the
same pattern when the nineteenth century neared its close. See Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-41 (1895) (examining "[tihe rule in England"
and "the practice in [the United States]" for guidance concerning the meaning
of the Confrontation Clause).
96. 2 N.C. 120, 1 Hayw. 104 (1794).
97. Id. at 120, 1 Hayw. at 104.
98. Id. at 120, 1 Hayw. at 104.
99. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58 (1821).
100. Id. at 59.
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ment in the defendant's presence.101 Citing Webb and the com-
mon law rules that had grown up around England's sixteenth-
century bail and committal statutes, 102 the court held that the
witness's statements were properly admitted. 103 The defendant
had been personally present when the witness gave his account
of the relevant events, the court concluded, and the defendant
could have cross-examined the witness if he had liked.104
In State v. Hill,05 the South Carolina Court of Appeals fol-
lowed the same analysis in a case in which the defendant was
charged with sexually abusing a child. 06 Although the child
died prior to trial and so was unavailable to testify, the court
held that the child's pretrial deposition was inadmissible be-
cause the defendant had not been present when the deposition
was taken and so he had no opportunity to cross-examine his
accuser.107
Like their English counterparts, these early authorities
give no indication that a defendant's opportunity to cross-
examine a hearsay declarant was sufficient only if the defen-
dant was assisted by counsel. 08 The Supreme Court of Tennes-
see's 1842 ruling in Bostick v. State'09 illustrates the way in
which courts focused squarely on pretrial cross-examination
opportunities that were afforded to defendants themselves.110
After being arrested for assault, Bostick was taken to the home
of a person named Lowe, where magistrates and Bostick's al-
leged victim were waiting."' When the magistrates indicated
101. Id. at 58.
102. See supra notes 33-70 and accompanying text (discussing the bail and
committal statutes, and the common law rules they provoked).
103. Johnston, 10 Tenn. at 59-60.
104. See id. at 59 (concluding that the statutory requirements that the de-
fendant be present at the deposition and have an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness were met); cf. Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 434,
437-40 (1836) (stating that a since-deceased witness's statements to a magi-
strate would have been admissible because the defendant was present when
the statements were made and he could have cross-examined the witness if he
had liked, but ultimately excluding the statements because other witnesses'
descriptions of the decedent's statements were imprecise).
105. 20 S.C.L. 272, 2 Hill. 607 (S.C. Ct. App. 1835).
106. Id. at 272-73, 2 Hill. at 607-09.
107. Id. at 272-74, 2 Hill. at 608-11.
108. E.g., id. at 272, 2 Hill. at 608 (requiring only that the deposition be
"taken in the presence of the prisoner, who is allowed the right to cross ex-
amine" and not discussing a right to counsel).
109. 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 344 (1842).
110. Id. at 345-46.
111. Id.at344.
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that they intended to take the victim's deposition, Bostick said
that he did not want to be in the same room, or even in the
same building, "where the wounded man lay."112 The magi-
strates proceeded with the deposition after Bostick left the
house, and the victim later died. 113 At Bostick's ensuing murder
trial, the court admitted the victim's deposition into evi-
dence."14 After speculating that Bostick might have left Lowe's
home because he would have found it "painful to his feelings to
have been in the presence of the wounded man, and to have
heard a recapitulation of the circumstances from his lips,"115
the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the ruling:
[H]e knew the deposition was being taken; he might have been im-
mediately present if he would; he was asked, but declined to be so.
His constitutional right, therefore, of meeting his witnesses face to
face was not infringed, and it would be most dangerous to permit per-
sons to exclude such testimony by refusing to go into the immediate
presence of the injured party testifying. We think, therefore, that this
deposition was properly admitted . 116
The court said nothing about the possibility that Bostick could
have relied upon an attorney to conduct the cross-examination
on his behalf.117
The absence of any reference to attorneys in these early
authorities reflects two beliefs: that the right to counsel did not
attach at preliminary investigative proceedings (a matter ad-
dressed in Part II of this article), and that the value of confron-
tation lay primarily in forcing a witness to make his or her ac-
cusations in a public, face-to-face exchange with the defendant
rather than in exposing a witness to a professional trained in
the art of cross-examining witnesses. 118 It was not until well in-
to the nineteenth century that authorities began to link defen-
dants' right of confrontation to the skills wielded by defendants'
attorneys. 119 Far more prevalent in the late eighteenth and ear-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 345-46.
116. Id. at 346.
117. Cf. id. at 344-46 (lacking any discussion of counsel).
118. See id. (declaring that the "intent of the State" was to ensure the de-
fendant himself be present at the taking of a deposition, and not an attorney).
119. See William David Evans, On the Law of Evidence, in 2 M. POTHIER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, OR CONTRACTS 110, 178 (Philadel-
phia, Robert H. Small 1839) (observing that when a witness is deposed by a
magistrate in the defendant's presence pursuant to the Marian bail and com-
mittal statutes, the defendant "has not those assistances for analysing the
proofs which are adduced against him, which exist upon a solemn trial, where
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ly nineteenth centuries was the view that confrontation's pri-
mary value lay in forcing a witness to accuse a defendant to his
or her face, and to force the witness to endure any adversarial
exchange with the defendant which might ensue.120
By conceiving of confrontation's chief value in that way,
authorities in early America were continuing to emphasize the
same point that Sir Walter Raleigh famously articulated in his
1603 trial for treason.121 Raleigh did not demand assistance in
cross-examining his accuser, Lord Cobham; rather, he insisted
upon an opportunity for a face-to-face confrontation with Cob-
ham in the presence of the judges: "Call my Accuser before my
Face, and I have done .... I beseech you, my lords, let Cobham
be sent for, charm him on his soul, on his Allegiance to the
King; if he affirm it, I am guilty."122 Raleigh expressed no
doubts about his own cross-examination skills; rather, he was
driven by the belief that Cobham would find it easier to lie in a
private conversation with the Crown's representatives than in
a public, face-to-face exchange with Raleigh himself.123
he can call in aid the exertions of judicious advocates"); see also Landsman,
supra note 76, at 599 (stating that, prior to Evans, scholars devoted little at-
tention to the need to enlist counsel's assistance when cross-examining wit-
nesses, and arguing that "Evans's work embodied a new conception of the legal
process, one in which the cross-examination of witnesses by skilled counsel
was of such importance that the process was rendered suspect without it").
120. See LEONARD MACNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 360 (Dublin, H. Fitzpatrick 1802) (stating that "[n]o evidence can be
received against a prisoner but in his presence" and that this rule ensures that
a witness can be cross-examined by "the party who would be affected by such
evidence"); S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 173 (New
York, Gould, Banks, & Gould 1816) (calling it "a general principle in the law of
evidence" that "if any fact is to be substantiated against a person, it ought to
be proved in his presence by the testimony of a witness sworn to speak the
truth; . .. [so] that the person, who is to be affected by the evidence, may have
an opportunity of interrogating the witness"); Landsman, supra note 76, at
599 (stating that courts and scholars in that era focused on the desirability of
ensuring that there was a "physical confrontation between witness and ac-
cused"); Donald Dripps, Sixth-Amendment Originalism's Collision Course with
the Right to Counsel: What's Titanic, What's Iceberg? 31 (Univ. of San Diego
Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 07-79, 2006), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=952508 ("The historical evidence shows that throughout the first half
of the nineteenth century, American lawyers regarded the confrontation re-
quired for prosecution hearsay to be admissible at trial to be the confrontation
of the witness, under oath, by the suspect personally.").
121. See Raleigh's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603); see also supra note 42 (not-
ing Raleigh's trial and commentary upon it).
122. Raleigh, 2 How. St. Tr. at 15-16.
123. See id. (quoting Raleigh as requesting Cobham's public appearance).
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Well into the nineteenth century, many people continued to
share Raleigh's beliefs about human nature and its relation to
the value of confrontation. In its 1844 ruling in State v. Camp-
bell,124 for example, the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled
that a deposition was inadmissible because it had been taken
outside the defendant's presence with no opportunity for cross-
examination.125 Echoes of Raleigh are unmistakable in the
court's reasoning:
The practical good sense of such examination of witnesses, confronted
by the accused, is readily understood. Any man of experience who has
heard tales told by one man against his neighbor, behind his back,
and again told, when placed face to face, and new views are suggested
by the man he had accused, and possibly belied-any one [sic] that
[sic] has known such occurrences, will readily conceive [the impor-
tance of demanding that a witness be confronted by the person he ac-
cuses]. Experience has proved that it is, of all others, the most effec-
tive, the most satisfactory, and the most indispensable test of the
evidence narrated on the witness's stand.126
Even today, the Supreme Court continues to reiterate Raleigh's
core concern, 127 while seventeen state constitutions frame the
confrontation right in Raleigh's language, assuring criminal de-
fendants of the right to meet their accusers "face to face."12 8
Like their English contemporaries, American courts in the
mid-nineteenth century certainly recognized that defendants
could rely upon an attorney to conduct a cross-examination, if
fortunate enough to be accompanied by one when confronting a
hearsay declarant prior to trial. In a pair of rulings from the
1850s, for example, the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Il-
linois and the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the deposi-
tions of unavailable witnesses were admissible because those
124. 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124 (S.C. Ct. App. 1844).
125. Id. at 125-26 ("[The witness] must be subjected, personally, to the ex-
amination of the man he accuses.").
126. Id. at 126.
127. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) ("[There is something
deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused
and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution."' (quoting
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965))); id. at 1019 ("It is always more dif-
ficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back."'); cf. Mary-
land v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990) ("Although face-to-face confrontation
forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause, we have
nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation
right." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
128. See Katherine W. Grearson, Note, Proposed Uniform Child Witness
Testimony Act: An Impermissible Abridgment of Criminal Defendants' Rights,
45 B.C. L. REV. 467, 480 (2004) (noting that seventeen state constitutions con-
tain the "face to face" language).
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depositions had been taken in the defendants' presence and the
witnesses had been cross-examined by the defendants' attor-
neys.129 But the assistance of counsel in those cases was a for-
tuitous luxury, rather than a constitutional necessity: the his-
torical record provides no indication that eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century courts deemed counsel's pretrial assistance
with cross-examinations essential.130
It was not until the Supreme Court's ruling in Pointer v.
Texasl 31-nearly two centuries after the nation's founding, and
without the benefit of any briefing on the meaning of the Con-
frontation Clausel 32-that a defendant's pretrial opportunity to
cross-examine a hearsay declarant was deemed insufficient to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause due to the lack of attorney
aid.133 The Crawford Court's rejection of Ohio v. Roberts sug-
gests that Pointer and its progeny now stand on perilous
ground.134 The Roberts decision had allowed trial judges to ad-
mit hearsay that they believed possessed "indicia of reliabili-
ty."13 5 The Crawford Court held this to be a misconstruction of
the protection that the Confrontation Clause affords criminal
defendants: "[I]t is a procedural guarantee rather than a subs-
tantive guarantee . . .. It commands, not that evidence be reli-
able, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination."136 Like Roberts,
129. See United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1132-34 (C.C.D. Ill.
1851) (No. 15,702) (arguing that the law of evidence is "quite stringent enough
in excluding testimony"); State v. McO'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, 418 (Mo. 1857)
(Ryland, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant had been represented by
counsel and that counsel had cross-examined the witness).
130. See, e.g., McO'Blenis, 24 Mo. at 418 (lacking any indication that coun-
sel was considered a necessity).
131. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
132. The parties' briefs in Pointer focused entirely on whether Pointer had
a right under the Sixth Amendment's Assistance of Counsel Clause to the ben-
efit of an attorney's aid when cross-examining an adverse witness at a prelim-
inary hearing. Neither brief specifically addressed the meaning of the Con-
frontation Clause. See Brief for Petitioner at 6-12, Pointer, 380 U.S. 400 (No.
577) (focusing entirely on the Assistance of Counsel Clause and its applicabili-
ty to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Brief
for Respondent at 7-14, Pointer, 380 U.S. 400 (No. 577) (focusing entirely on
the Assistance of Counsel Clause and whether the petitioner had waived his
right to an attorney's assistance).
133. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing Pointer).
134. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing Crawford's
rejection of Roberts).
135. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
136. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
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Pointer is aimed at trying to ensure a hearsay statement's re-
liability; it presumes (surely correctly) that a cross-examination
conducted by a skilled attorney is ordinarily more likely than a
cross-examination conducted by a defendant to ferret out all of
the reasons why a witness's statements should not be
trusted.137 But if the Confrontation Clause's chief concern is not
that statements be reliable, but rather that statements' relia-
bility be assessed in a particular way, then by Crawford's logic
the question is not whether one procedure is more likely than
another to expose unreliable statements. 138 Instead, the ques-
tion is what specific procedure the Confrontation Clause de-
mands.139
Although we now believe that the most rigorous way to test
a hearsay statement's trustworthiness is to force the declarant
to endure questioning by a professionally trained attorney, the
historical record is quite clear about what late-eighteenth-
century authorities believed was sufficient to protect defen-
dants' rights.140 Under the eighteenth-century common law
principles that the Court today says the Sixth Amendment in-
corporates, a defendant's confrontation rights are vindicated by
a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine a hearsay declarant
who later becomes unavailable to testify, even if the defendant
has to conduct that cross-examination on his or her own, with-
out the assistance of counsel.141
If a defendant faced with the task of cross-examining a
hearsay declarant prior to trial is going to make a persuasive
showing of entitlement to counsel's assistance, therefore, he or
she is going to have to rely upon constitutional provisions other
than the Confrontation Clause. The two leading candidates are
the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment 42
and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.143 Those constitutional texts provide relief in cer-
tain circumstances, but in others they leave defendants respon-
sible for conducting cross-examinations on their own.
137. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1964) ("The case before us
would be quite a different one had [the witness's] statement been taken at a
full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who
had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine.").
138. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
143. Id. amends. V & XIV.
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II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
One might assume that the Sixth Amendment's Assistance
of Counsel Clause 44 always guarantees defendants the right to
an attorney's aid when cross-examining hearsay declarants
prior to trial, thereby fully covering the gaps left by the recent-
ly refocused Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, however, does not immediately attach upon the
launching of a criminal investigation.14 5 As a result, law-
enforcement officers routinely secure testimonial statements
before the time at which a suspect is constitutionally entitled to
an attorney's help.146 Moreover, even after the right to counsel
has attached, defendants and their attorneys ordinarily are not
entitled to be present when government officials interview wit-
nesses in preparation for trial.147 Questions concerning the in-
tersection of the Confrontation and Assistance of Counsel
Clauses are thus more complicated than they might first ap-
pear. The primary question is this: when a defendant is af-
forded a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine a witness pur-
suant to the Confrontation Clause, does the Assistance of
Counsel Clause ever grant the defendant the right to the aid of
an attorney?
This Part makes two principal arguments. If the govern-
ment wishes to ensure that a hearsay declarant's testimonial
statements will be admissible in the event that the witness be-
comes unavailable to testify at trial, the government must af-
ford the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the decla-
rant with counsel's assistance, provided the witness is available
to testify when the defendant's right to counsel attaches. But if
the witness has already become unavailable by the time the de-
fendant's right to counsel has attached, then the Assistance of
Counsel Clause poses no obstacle to admitting the witness's
statements into evidence.
144. Id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
145. See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text (discussing when the
right to counsel attaches).
146. Cf. infra Part II.B.2 (examining a defendant's own statement made
before the right to counsel attached).
147. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing when de-
fendants and attorneys are entitled to be present at pretrial interrogations).
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A. THE ATTACHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE
IDENTIFICATION OF "CRITICAL STAGES"
A criminal suspect's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at-
taches when the government commences adversarial judicial
proceedings against him or her, "whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or ar-
raignment."148 The right to counsel does not attach prior to that
point because, until "the government has used the judicial ma-
chinery to signal a commitment to prosecute," 149 there is no
need to ensure "that the prosecution's case [encounters] the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing,"150 and thus the
suspect need not yet worry about mastering legal intricacies or
about withstanding "trial-type confrontations with the prosecu-
tor."15 1 As Justice Stewart wrote in 1972,
[t]he initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary
criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has commit-
ted itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of
government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant
finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society,
and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural crimi-
nal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of
the "criminal prosecutions" to which alone the explicit guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment are applicable.152
After the government has initiated adversarial judicial
proceedings, the defendant is entitled to counsel's assistance at
each "critical stage" of the ensuing prosecutorial process. 153 A
148. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2581 (stating that the right to counsel
"applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant is
told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed on his
liberty"); id. (holding that the attachment of the right does not depend upon
whether the prosecutor is "aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its
conduct"); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986) (stating that a defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the govern-
ment's activities with respect to that defendant have "shift[ed] from investiga-
tion to accusation").
149. Rothgery, 128 S. Ct. at 2591 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
151. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188-90 (1984).
152. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (plurality opinion); see
also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (adopting the Kirby plurali-
ty's analysis).
153. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004) ("The Sixth Amendment se-
cures to a defendant who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all 'critical
stages' of the criminal process.").
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stage is "critical" if it entails a "trial-like"154 encounter between
the defendant and the government, such that the defendant
might need professional assistance "in coping with legal prob-
lems or .. . in meeting his adversary." 155 The right to legal re-
presentation during these encounters is essential, the Court
has explained, because what transpires on these occasions
"might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself
to a mere formality."156 If defense counsel's ability to protect
the defendant's interests at trial would not be significantly
harmed by defense counsel's absence at the pretrial encounter,
then the encounter is not critical and defense counsel's pres-
ence there is not constitutionally required. But if defense coun-
sel's best efforts at trial likely could not remedy any deficien-
cies abetted by his or her absence at the pretrial encounter,
then the encounter is critical and the defendant is entitled to
have his or her attorney present.
Using these tests and rationales, the Court has sifted
through a variety of pretrial events, distinguishing between
those that are critical and those that are not. The Court has
concluded, for example, that after the government has
launched judicial proceedings against a defendant, he or she
has a Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel
whenever he or she is interrogated by government officials or
by those acting on government officials' behalf.157 Given the ir-
remediable damage that an unrepresented defendant might
self-inflict during pretrial questioning, the Court's designation
of defendants' interrogations as "critical" is hardly surprising.
Perhaps less obviously, the Court has held that defendants are
constitutionally entitled to have their attorneys present when
they are placed in a postattachment physical lineup for viewing
154. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973).
155. Id. at 313; see also id. at 310 (stating that the right to counsel extends
to "pretrial events that might appropriately be considered to be parts of the
trial itself" because "[a]t these ... events, the accused [is] confronted, just as
at trial, by the procedural system, or by his expert adversary, or by both").
156. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
157. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986) ("[A]bsent a valid
waiver, the defendant has the right to the presence of an attorney during any
interrogation occurring after the first formal charging proceeding . . . ."); Mas-
siah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding that Massiah's right to
counsel had been violated "when there was used against him at his trial evi-
dence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him (through a surrogate] after he had been indicted and in the
absence of his counsel").
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and identification by witnesses.158 The Court has explained
that "the accused's inability effectively to reconstruct at trial
any unfairness that occurred at the lineup may deprive him of
his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of
the witness's courtroom identification." 15 9
A defendant is not entitled to an attorney's presence, how-
ever, when witnesses are asked merely to view photo arrays in
which the defendant's picture appears.160 The Court has con-
cluded that, because the defendant is not personally present on
those occasions, "no possibility arises that the accused might be
misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by
his professional adversary."161 The same ordinarily is true of
the government's pretrial examination of "the accused's finger-
prints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like."16 2 Aided by
his or her attorney, the defendant can simply confront the re-
sults of those pretrial analyses when they are offered into evi-
dence at trial:
Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently
available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the ac-
cused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Gov-
ernment's case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-
examination of the Government's expert witnesses and the presenta-
tion of the evidence of his own experts. The denial of a right to have
his counsel present at such analyses does not therefore violate the
Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is minimal
risk that his counsel's absence at such stages might derogate from his
right to a fair trial. 163
The Court has placed the government's pretrial interroga-
tions of witnesses into the category of noncritical events-
neither the defendant nor his or her attorney is ordinarily en-
titled to be present.16 4 "The traditional counterbalance in the
American adversary system for these interviews arises from
the equal ability of defense counsel to seek and interview wit-
nesses himself," the Court has said.165 Because the defendant
ordinarily is not present at the interrogation, the situation is
similar to the government's presentation of photo arrays to
witnesses: there is no risk that the defendant will "be misled by
158. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 231-32.
159. Id.
160. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973).
161. Id.
162. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
163. Id. at 227-28.
164. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 317-18 (discussing witness interviews).
165. Id. at 318.
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his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his pro-
fessional adversary."166 Moreover, what a witness says in a pre-
trial interview with government investigators is usually peri-
pheral to determining the defendant's fate at trial; it is what a
witness says to the jury that matters. An attorney's opportuni-
ty to cross-examine a witness at trial is ordinarily thus far su-
perior to an opportunity to cross-examine a witness during a
pretrial interview. Indeed, rather than unleash a blistering
cross-examination in a pretrial setting, a defense attorney
might very well want to reserve her most devastating questions
for the actual trial, so that the witness's first encounter with
those questions takes place under the watchful eye of the jury.
That line of reasoning is obviously thwarted, however,
when a witness whom government officials have interviewed ex
parte later dies or becomes otherwise unavailable to testify. As
discussed in Part I, the Confrontation Clause's chief function in
that circumstance is to bar the admission of the unavailable
witness's testimonial pretrial statements unless the defendant
was given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.16 7 Be-
fore Crawford realigned the Court's confrontation jurispru-
dence to focus solely on eighteenth-century common law prin-
ciples, Pointer safely assured the defendant in that scenario
that the unavailable witness's statements would be inadmissi-
ble unless the defendant was given the chance to enlist the aid
of an attorney when conducting the pretrial cross-
examination.16 8 Given the peril in which Pointer now stands,
defendants desiring an attorney's assistance with pretrial
cross-examinations must turn to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to see whether it affords relief. Does it bridge the gaps
that the Confrontation Clause now creates?
B. THE LIMITS AND BREADTH OF THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY'S
ASSISTANCE WITH PRETRIAL CROSS-EXAMINATIONS
If prosecutors fear that a witness will be unavailable to
testify by the time the defendant's trial date arrives, and they
want to ensure that the witness's testimonial hearsay state-
ments can nevertheless be admitted into evidence, the Confron-
tation Clause demands that they afford the defendant a pretri-
al opportunity to cross-examine the witneSS.169 For purposes of
166. Id. at 317 (discussing photo arrays).
167. See supra notes 5--9, 91-120 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 5-9, 91-107 and accompanying text.
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conducting the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel analysis,
those pretrial cross-examination opportunities may be divided
into two categories: those in which the opportunity is afforded
after the defendant's right to counsel has attached and those in
which the opportunity is afforded before attachment occurs.
1. Cross-Examination Opportunities Afforded After
Attachment
An opportunity to cross-examine a witness after a defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached plainly
bears the hallmarks of a "critical stage" necessitating defense
counsel's participation. By its very design it is a trial-like en-
counter, aimed at approximating the confrontation that would
occur at trial between the defendant on the one hand, and the
prosecution's witness and the law's complexities on the other.170
To cross-examine a witness effectively-whether at trial or be-
fore-one generally must be familiar with the nuances of the
law under which the defendant has been charged, so that one
can identify the points on which the government's case is most
vulnerable and then question the witness with an eye toward
exploiting those weaknesses. An effective cross-examination
thus often requires the kind of legal knowledge that the Court
has said makes the assistance of defense counsel appropri-
ate.171 Moreover, if the defendant's attorney was not permitted
to assist with the pretrial cross-examination and the witness
later became unavailable to testify, the attorney's ability to
protect the defendant's interests at trial would be compro-
mised-the attorney would have no opportunity to fill any gaps
left by the defendant's questioning.172 A defendant is therefore
entitled to have an attorney's assistance when cross-examining
witnesses prior to trial, so long as the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has already attached.173 In both
-170. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text (discussing the fact
that "critical stages" are those that involve trial-like encounters between the
defendant and the government).
171. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text (discussing the fact
that occasions requiring detailed legal knowledge are likely to be judged "criti-
cal occasions" warranting defense counsel's presence).
172. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the test that
asks whether defense counsel's participation at trial is an adequate substitute
for defense counsel's participation at a pretrial event, and that designates a
pretrial event as a "critical stage" if that question is answered in the negative).
173. Cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (plurality opinion) (con-
cluding that a preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" requiring defense
counsel's participation because it was an opportunity for the defendant's at-
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trial and pretrial situations, the defendant needs counsel's help
"in coping with legal problems [and] in meeting his adver-
sary." 74
Of course, the mere fact that a pretrial cross-examination
opportunity is offered to a defendant and his or her attorney
does not necessarily mean that it is an offer they will accept.
Upon being given that opportunity, the defense must make dif-
ficult tactical decisions, based on its assessment of the likeli-
hood that the witness actually will be available to testify at tri-
al and based on how willing the defense is to wait until trial to
see how the witness will respond to particular lines of question-
ing. For example, a defendant and his or her attorney might opt
to decline the pretrial cross-examination opportunity in the
hope that the witness will still be available to testify when the
defendant's trial date arrives. After all, if the witness remains
available to testify at the time of trial, the prosecutors will be
obligated by the Confrontation Clause to call the witness to the
stand if they wish to introduce that witness's testimonial hear-
say statements into evidence, 75 and the witness will have to
respond to the defense's tough questions for the first time in
the presence of the jury. These are difficult decisions, to be
sure, but they are the kinds of decisions that attorneys are
trained to make, and a defendant is entitled to rely upon his or
her attorney when making them.
2. Cross-Examination Opportunities Afforded Before
Attachment
When a defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness before his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
attached, the Assistance of Counsel Clause does not grant the
defendant any relief.176 If adversarial judicial proceedings have
not yet commenced, then the defendant has no claim to the
Sixth Amendment's protection, no matter how vitally impor-
tant, or "critical," the cross-examination opportunity might
be.'77
torney to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses and thereby "expose fatal
weaknesses in the State's case").
174. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313 (1973).
175. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of
unavailability).
176. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2591 (2008).
177. See id. ("Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled to the
presence of appointed counsel during any 'critical stage' of the postattachment
proceedings . . . ." (emphasis added)).
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The Court's 1986 ruling in Moran v. Burbine178 is instruc-
tive on this point. In that case, police were questioning Brian
Burbine, a murder suspect, at the stationhouse prior to the
commencement of judicial proceedings against him.179 Unbe-
knownst to Burbine, an attorney wishing to represent him had
telephoned the stationhouse and was assured that Burbine
would not be questioned further until the following day.180 The
police nevertheless continued to press ahead with their interro-
gation that same evening, and secured Burbine's confession.181
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment posed no obstacle to
the confession's admission at trial:
Because confessions elicited during the course of police questioning
often seal a suspect's fate, [Burbine] argues, the need for an advo-
cate . . . is at its zenith, regardless of whether the State has initiated
the first adversar[ial] judicial proceeding. We do not doubt that a
lawyer's presence could be of value to the suspect; and we readily
agree that if a suspect confesses, his attorney's case at trial will be
that much more difficult. But these concerns are no[t] decisive in this
context ... . For an interrogation, no more or less than for any other
"critical" pretrial event, the possibility that the encounter may have
important consequences at trial, standing alone, is insufficient to
trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.182
Under Moran's logic, it is clear that, when given a pre-
attachment opportunity to cross-examine a hearsay declarant,
a defendant lacks a Sixth Amendment right to an attorney's as-
sistance. The witness's hearsay statements to the authorities
might be critically important-even tantamount to the defen-
dant's own confession of guilt-and an effective cross-
examination might thus be crucial to the defense's success. But
if the defendant's right to counsel has not yet attached, it af-
fords him or her no relief.
There is, however, one argument that defendants should
make, in appropriate cases, once their Sixth Amendment right
to counsel does attach. By the time of attachment, the govern-
ment may have already given the defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine a witness without the aid of his or her attorney.
The government may therefore have laid the groundwork for
arguing that the Confrontation Clause would not bar the ad-
mission of that witness's statements if the witness became un-
available to testify. In that circumstance, the defendant's at-
178. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
179. See id. at 416-18.
180. See id. at 417.
181. See id. at 417-18.
182. Id. at 431-32.
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torney ought to have the power to demand that he or she be
given a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine the witness, if he
or she fears that the witness will be unavailable to testify by
the time the defendant's trial date arrives. If that demand is re-
fused and the witness does indeed become unavailable, the As-
sistance of Counsel Clause ought to render the hearsay state-
ments inadmissible.
When confronting a hearsay declarant at trial, the defen-
dant is fully entitled to rely upon his or her attorney to conduct
the cross-examination, regardless of any cross-examination
that the defendant might previously have tried to conduct on
his or her own. 183 Let us assume that the defendant was given
an early opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on his or
her own, that the defendant's right to counsel has since at-
tached, that the declarant remains available to testify, and that
the defendant's trial date has not yet arrived. If the defendant
perceives ways in which an attorney's cross-examination would
likely be more effective than his or her own preattachment
cross-examination effort, there is no reason why defense coun-
sel's ability to cross-examine the declarant must be forestalled
until trial, with the defendant bearing the risk that the decla-
rant will become unavailable to testify in the meantime. In-
deed, were the rule otherwise, the government would have a
perverse incentive to offer unrepresented defendants a pre-
attachment opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses
who have supplied the government with testimonial state-
ments, and then claim that each of those witnesses is somehow
shielded from exposure to the defendant's attorney unless their
availability extends to the time of trial. Of course, defense
counsel might opt not to take advantage of the pretrial cross-
examination opportunity, hoping the witness will remain avail-
able until trial and thus will have to endure cross-examination
for the first time in the presence of the jury.184 But if the pre-
trial cross-examination opportunity is demanded and denied,
and the witness ultimately proves to be unavailable to testify at
trial, the Assistance of Counsel Clause ought to render the wit-
ness's testimonial hearsay statements inadmissible.
183. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying note 166 (acknowledging this possible
line of reasoning). If the witness has already become unavailable by the time
the right to counsel attaches, then the defendant will be out of luck-for pur-
poses of the Sixth Amendment, his or her pro se, preattachment opportunity to
cross-examine the witness will have to suffice.
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Even if that line of argument prevails, there still will be oc-
casions when neither the Confrontation Clause nor the Assis-
tance of Counsel Clause will stand in the way of admitting the
testimonial hearsay statements of an unavailable witness
whom only the defendant himself or herself has had a chance to
cross-examine. Neither Clause forbids the admission of a wit-
ness's statements if the defendant was given an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness prior to the time the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached and the witness
has already become unavailable to testify by the time attach-
ment does occur. Might due process principles cover that re-
maining gap?
III. THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS
Wholly apart from the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause and the Assistance of Counsel Clause, the Due Process
Clauses-which will be referred to in the singular from this
point forward 8 5-ensure in certain circumstances that the
hearsay statements of an unavailable witness are inadmissible
in a criminal trial unless the defendant was given a pretrial
opportunity to cross-examine the witness with the assistance of
counsel. Those circumstances are much narrower in scope,
however, than one might initially imagine. There are many oc-
casions when the Constitution leaves criminal defendants re-
sponsible for conducting pretrial cross-examinations on their
own.
A. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE'S NARROW FREESTANDING
SIGNIFICANCE
The Due Process Clause's overarching function in criminal
cases is to ensure that convictions are not secured by means
that are fundamentally unfair.186 Many of the provisions of the
185. There are, of course, two such clauses-one covering the federal gov-
ernment in the Fifth Amendment and the other covering the states in the
Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall
be .. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... );
id. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... ).
186. See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Proce-
dure: The Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 303, 355 (2001) (noting the "common description of due process rulings in
criminal procedure cases as applying a 'fundamental fairness' standard"); see,
e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982) ("Due
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Bill of Rights are aimed at achieving the same objective, but
speak in more specific terms to particular issues. The Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause and Assistance of Counsel
Clause, for example, focus on matters relating to the cross-
examination of witnesses 87 and a defendant's right to legal re-
presentation,188 respectively. Recognizing that "the specific
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights" address numerous
aspects of criminal investigations and trials, the Supreme
Court has said that, in criminal cases, the territory committed
wholly to the Due Process Clause is "very narrow[]" and the
Due Process Clause thus "'has limited operation.' 1 89 If judges
were to ascribe broad free-standing significance to the Due
Process Clause, the Court has warned, they would threaten
both to encroach upon elected leaders' lawmaking prerogatives
and to undermine the Constitution's effort to balance defen-
dants' and society's divergent interests.190 "The Bill of Rights
speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure,"
the Court has explained, "and the expansion of those constitu-
tional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due
Process Clause invites undue interference with both considered
legislative judgments and the careful balance that the Consti-
tution strikes between liberty and order."191
process guarantees that a criminal defendant will be treated with that funda-
mental fairness essential to the very concept of justice." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . .").
188. Id. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right .. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
189. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (quoting Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)); cf. Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Em-
ployees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[R]ecent decisions suggest
that when faced with multiple, potentially relevant constitutional provisions,
courts should invoke the provision that treats most directly the right as-
serted."). The Court has reached a comparable conclusion with respect to subs-
tantive due process claims. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7
(1997) ("[Ilf a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provi-
sion, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed
under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric
of substantive due process."); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)
(stating that, when there is "an explicit textual source of constitutional protec-
tion against" a particular form of governmental conduct, that specific textual
provision, "not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must
be the guide for analyzing these claims").
190. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443.
191. Id.
COUNSEL AND CONFRONTATION
With respect to criminal investigations and prosecutions,
therefore, the Court has said that it will declare a state or fed-
eral practice unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause
only if that practice "offends some principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental"1 9 2 or "transgresses any recognized principle of
'fundamental fairness' in operation."193 Put another way, a
practice does not violate due process unless it "violates those
fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our
civil and political institutions ... and which define the commu-
nity's sense of fair play and decency." 194 The question in any
given case is not whether a given procedure is essential to
every imaginable form of civilized government; rather, the
question is whether the "procedure is necessary to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty."195
When conducting the due process analysis, the Court has
instructed judges to focus especially on "the relevant common-
law traditions of England and this country."196 To aid in under-
standing the content and import of those traditions, judges may
consider the way in which those traditions are understood by
modern English courts.197 Although the due process analysis is
primarily tradition focused, the Court has said that, to a more
limited degree, judges also should consider contemporary prac-
192. Id. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 124 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Occasions may arise where a proceed-
ing falls so far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as
to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process de-
spite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights.").
193. Medina, 505 U.S. at 448 (citing Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352); see also 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 600-01 (2d ed. 1999) (stating
that, when determining whether the government's implementation of a chal-
lenged practice violated due process in a particular case, the Court uses broad
principles of our adversarial system as a benchmark); id. at 603 ( "[T]he focus
must be on the operation of the practice in the individual case, and a state
practice therefore should not be deemed to violate due process unless it con-
flicts with a structural prerequisite of fairness in a manner that actually caus-
es substantial prejudice to the particular defendant.").
194. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968); see also id. ("A
criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to im-
agine. . . . Yet no American State has undertaken to construct such a sys-
tem.").
196. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996).
197. Id. at 358 (examining contemporary English authorities for confirma-
tion of the Court's interpretation of early common law authorities).
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tices in the United States.198 But when a defendant complains
that his or her jurisdiction is continuing to employ a common
law procedure that most other jurisdictions have abandoned,
the Court generally ascribes greater weight to the common law
than to the apparent contemporary consensus when trying to
determine the Constitution's due process demands.199 For ex-
ample, in an opinion upholding an Ohio rule requiring murder
defendants to carry the burden of proving self-defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the Court reasoned:
[T]he common-law rule was that affirmative defenses, including self-
defense, were matters for the defendant to prove.... Indeed, well into
this century, a number of States followed the common-law rule and
required a defendant to shoulder the burden of proving that he acted
in self-defense. . . . We are aware that all but two of the States, Ohio
and South Carolina, have abandoned the common-law rule and re-
quire the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defense when it is
properly raised by the defendant. But the question remains whether
those States are in violation of the Constitution; and ... that question
is not answered by cataloging the practices of other States. 200
As daunting as these hurdles are for criminal defendants
making freestanding due process claims, they are not always
insurmountable. As one commentator observes, it is the free-
standing significance of the Due Process Clause "that grants
the defendant such central protections as the right to an un-
biased judge, the right to a presumption of innocence, the right
to have the government prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the right to obtain exculpatory evidence in the gov-
ernment's possession."201 When holding that the Due Process
198. See id. at 360 (examining the states' contemporary practices with re-
spect to a particular burden of proof); Medina, 505 U.S. at 447 (stating that
the states' contemporary practices are "of limited relevance to the due process
inquiry," given the Court's primary focus on historical practices, but that they
nonetheless do carry some probative weight).
199. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 193, at 598-99 (making this point, but stat-
ing that when the challenged practice is representative of the contemporary
consensus, yet conflicts with the common law's approach, the Court is more
likely to ascribe greater weight to the contemporary consensus and thus
uphold the practice).
200. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1987); accord Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977) ("Nor does the fact that a majority of the States
have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses-for whatev-
er reasons-mean that those States that strike a different balance are in vi-
olation of the Constitution.").
201. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 18-19 (2006); see also Israel, supra note 186, at 389-95 (provid-
ing numerous examples of the work done by the free-standing Due Process
Clause). In fact, Israel argues that the frequency of the Court's reliance on the
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Clause requires that a criminal defendant's guilt be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, for example, the Court in In re
Winship202 reasoned that the reasonable-doubt standard "dates
at least from our early years as a nation,"203 that the Court's
prior opinions had long appeared to presume that "proof of a
criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally
required,"204 that the standard "plays a vital role in the Ameri-
can scheme of criminal procedure," 205 and that "use of the rea-
sonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the re-
spect and confidence of the community in applications of the
criminal law."206
B. THE LIMITS AND BREADTH OF THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY'S
ASSISTANCE WITH PRETRIAL CROSS-EXAMINATIONS
In a far greater number of cases than one might initially
suppose, the freestanding Due Process Clause does not guaran-
tee criminal defendants the right to an attorney's aid when
cross-examining witnesses prior to trial. Absent a change in the
Court's analytic framework, the due process argument is likely
to succeed only when a defendant's case is marked by unusual
circumstances that render the demands of fundamental fair-
ness especially acute.
1. Two Initial Obstacles
There are two potentially fatal problems with the argu-
ment that the freestanding Due Process Clause invariably en-
titles a defendant to the assistance of counsel when cross-
examining witnesses prior to trial. First, the Bill of Rights con-
tains two provisions-the Confrontation Clause and the Assis-
tance of Counsel Clause-that are tailored to speak directly to
the matter at issue and that stop short of always guaranteeing
defendants the assistance of counsel for pretrial cross-
examinations. 20 7 Many courts thus would likely regard the due
process argument as an illegitimate attempt to secure specific
free-standing Due Process Clause belies the notion that the Due Process
Clause has only limited significance. See id. at 398.
202. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
203. Id. at 361.
204. Id. at 362.
205. Id. at 363.
206. Id. at 364.
207. See supra Part I (discussing the Confrontation Clause); supra Part II
(discussing the Assistance of Counsel Clause).
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rights that the Constitution has intentionally been designed to
withhold.208 After all, the Supreme Court has urged judges to
be cautious about finding any criminal procedure mandated by
the freestanding Due Process Clause, given the large number of
other constitutional provisions that speak to the investigation
and prosecution of criminal defendants. 209 When one or more of
those other constitutional provisions speak directly to the me-
rits of the issue that a defendant has raised, and those provi-
sions do not grant the defendant the relief that he or she seeks,
many courts would be disposed against resurrecting the claim
by dressing it in the garb of the Due Process Clause.
Second, due process analysis turns to a great degree on a
court's assessment of our Anglo-American common law tradi-
tions. 210 Because the Court has held that the Confrontation
Clause incorporates the English common law as it was received
in the United States in the late eighteenth century,211 the same
common law traditions that doom a Confrontation Clause claim
of entitlement to the assistance of counsel for the pretrial cross-
examination of a witness also undercut that claim when it is
advanced under the banner of due process. The Court's ruling
in Pointer v. Texas 212-holding that a defendant's pretrial cross-
examination opportunity is insufficient for Confrontation
Clause purposes unless the defendant has counsel's assis-
tance213-is at risk today precisely because it deviates from the
common law traditions that the Confrontation Clause now in-
corporates. 214 The content of those traditions does not change
when one examines them through the lens of due process.
There is a great likelihood, therefore, that many courts to-
day would reject a defendant's argument that the Due Process
Clause automatically renders an unavailable witness's hearsay
208. Cf. McCorkle v. United States, No. 6:06CV950, 2008 WL 114943, at
*15 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2008) ("Petitioner cannot use a baseless due process vi-
olation claim to resuscitate a failed ineffective assistance of counsel claim.");
Wallace v. Price, No. 99-231, 2002 WL 31180963, at *57 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 1,
2002) ("I am not even sure that this is a separate constitutional claim at all,
rather than just a rehash of his Sixth Amendment fair-cross section claim. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned courts about creating new constitu-
tional rights under the guise of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
209. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
212. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
213. Id. at 407.
214. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing Pointer).
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statements inadmissible at trial unless the defendant was giv-
en a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine the witness with the
assistance of counsel. Before declaring the matter wholly re-
solved, however, one must consider two additional analytic
touchstones-contemporary practices in the United States and
modern English courts' interpretations of the common law tra-
ditions that England bequeathed to America. 215 Neither of
those sources provides defendants with the ammunition they
need.
2. Contemporary Practices in the United States
Contemporary practices in the United States say very little
about whether the nation invariably regards it as fundamental-
ly unfair to require defendants to proceed on their own when
given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses prior to the
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. For more
than forty years, Pointer v. Texas has given state and federal
authorities no choice on the matter: they have been told that,
absent a defendant's valid waiver of counsel's assistance, the
Confrontation Clause does not permit them to rely upon pro se
cross-examination opportunities to justify the admission of an
unavailable witness's hearsay statements. 216 It thus has not
been since the pre-Pointer era that the nation's various juris-
dictions have been free to take divergent approaches. Because
the Court has only recently realigned the Confrontation Clause
with eighteenth-century common law principles, 217 and because
state and federal officials likely have not yet realized the peril
in which that realignment places Pointer, it is far too soon to
look for legislative or adjudicative trends that might meaning-
fully inform a court's due process analysis.
If one were to go back to the pre-Pointer period and conduct
the due process analysis under the state of affairs that existed
at that time, defendants' due process argument would probably
fail. To cast that argument in its most flattering light, suppose
that, at the time Pointer was decided, there was only one Amer-
ican jurisdiction that believed pro se cross-examination oppor-
tunities were sufficient: the state of Texas, from which Pointer
itself arose. As already indicated, when a jurisdiction flouts a
215. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (identifying these
touchstones).
216. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407; supra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text (discussing Pointer).
217. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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modern trend by continuing to adhere to a common law tradi-
tion, the Court's due process analysis places greater weight on
the common law tradition than on the apparent contemporary
consensus. 218 Even if Texas were the nation's only jurisdiction
to regard pro se cross-examination opportunities as adequate,
therefore, a court in the pre-Pointer era presumably would have
been reluctant to hold that Texas's practice violated the Due
Process Clause. Texas's judgment on the matter fully accorded
with the nation's common law traditions, and it is those tradi-
tions that carry the greatest weight with the courts. 219
Courts today thus lack a solid basis for concluding that, in
the eyes of the American people, practices akin to those that
Texas employed prior to Pointer always violate a "recognized
principle of 'fundamental fairness' in operation"220 or violate
the "fundamental conceptions of justice ... which define the
community's sense of fair play and decency."221
3. Modern English Authorities
In determining whether the Due Process Clause always as-
sures criminal defendants of the right to counsel's assistance
when conducting pretrial cross-examinations, the final step is
to consider modern English authorities' understanding of the
relevant common law traditions. 222 Defendants seeking to bol-
ster their due process argument will find no support among
those transatlantic authorities. To this day, neither Parliament
nor England's judges have imposed a blanket requirement of
counsel's assistance comparable to what Pointer prescribed for
the United States in 1965. England has never regarded coun-
sel's assistance with pretrial cross-examinations as invariably
essential.223 Indeed, England's traditions have evolved to the
point today where there are many instances in which testi-
monial hearsay statements are admissible in criminal cases
218. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (discussing Martin
and Patterson).
219. See supra Part I.B (describing the traditions); supra notes 196-97 and
accompanying text.
220. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (citing Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)).
221. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).
222. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part L.A (outlining early English common law); infra notes
225-36, 256-62 and accompanying text (describing modern English hearsay
doctrine).
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even though the declarant has never been cross-examined by
anyone at all.2 2 4 In light of our shared heritage, an examination
of England's approach to issues of counsel, confrontation, and
due process thus can serve as a provocative check on the as-
sumptions that many in the United States today might quickly
make concerning the invariable necessity of counsel's assis-
tance with pretrial cross-examinations.
As noted in Part I, Parliament's 1848 Indictable Offenses
Act 225 codified the common law rule that pretrial cross-
examinations conducted by unrepresented defendants were suf-
ficient to vindicate those defendants' confrontation rights when
hearsay declarants were unavailable to testify at trial.22 6 Al-
though a defendant could rely upon an attorney to cross-
examine a witness at a pretrial deposition if he or she was for-
tunate enough to be represented by counsel, counsel's presence
and participation were not essential. If the defendant was un-
represented, the witness's statements would be admissible at
trial, so long as the witness had become unavailable to testify
and the official taking the deposition gave the defendant an op-
portunity to interrogate the witness on his or her own.
The same rule was still very much alive more than a half-
century later. In its 1925 Criminal Justice Act,2 2 7 Parliament
again authorized the admission of depositions taken by magi-
strates at preliminary hearings, if two requirements were met:
(1) the deponent was found to be "dead or insane, or so ill as not
to be able to travel, or to be kept out of the way by means of the
procurement of the accused"; and (2) "the deposition was taken
in the presence of the accused and. . . the accused or his coun-
sel or solicitor had full opportunity of cross-examining the wit-
ness."2 2 8 As was true under the 1848 Act, cross-examinations by
defendants' attorneys were permitted, but cross-examinations
by unrepresented defendants were sufficient.
Parliament significantly broadened the admissibility of
certain forms of hearsay in its 1967 Criminal Justice Act. 2 2 9 In
that legislation, Parliament declared that, if a witness fell with-
224. See, e.g., infra note 259 and accompanying text.
225. Indictable Offenses Act, supra note 83.
226. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (describing the Indict-
able Offenses Act).
227. Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86 (Eng.).
228. Id. § 13(3) (emphasis added); see also JR SPENCER, HEARSAY EVI-
DENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 99-100 & n.2 (2008) (stating that the 1925
Act codified the then-existing practice).
229. See Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 2(7) (Eng.).
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in one of the 1925 Act's categories of unavailability, limited
forms of written hearsay statements could be admitted into
evidence at trial, even if neither the defendant nor his or her
attorney had ever been given an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness who wrote them. 2 30 As a result, when prosecutors
offered an authorized form of written hearsay into evidence in
the absence of any prior cross-examination opportunity, the de-
fendant could only hope that the trial court would agree to ex-
ercise its common law discretion to exclude the hearsay on
grounds of fairness. 231
In its 1988 Criminal Justice Act, Parliament loosened the
restrictions on the admissibility of unavailable witnesses' writ-
ten hearsay still further, both by authorizing the admission of a
broader range of written pretrial statements and by expanding
the ways in which a witness could be deemed unavailable to
testify live at trial.232 Parliament declared that all documenta-
ry hearsay was admissible in criminal trials-regardless of how
the written statements were produced-so long as the decla-
rant was unavailable to testify at trial due to death, bodily or
mental illness, absence from the United Kingdom, or disap-
pearance despite the proponent's reasonable efforts to locate
him or her.2 33 Just as in the 1967 Act, Parliament declined to
230. See id. To qualify for admission under this provision, the statement
had to have been tendered for admission in the earlier committal proceedings
before a magistrate; the statement could not have drawn an objection from
any party when it was tendered in the earlier committal proceedings; the
statement had to be signed by the declarant; and the declarant had to attest in
writing that the statement was "true to the best of his knowledge and belief"
and that he or she knew that he or she could be prosecuted if the statement
asserted matters that the declarant "knew to be false or did not believe to be
true." Id. §§ 2(2), 2(7).
231. See Scott v. R, [1989] 2 All E.R. 305, 310-12 (P.C. 1989) (appeal taken
from Jam.) (citing instances of discretionary exclusion both prior to and after
the 1967 Act). In a 1983 ruling concerning a defendant's conviction for theft,
for example, an appellate panel ruled that the trial court had abused its com-
mon law discretion when it admitted the nonconfronted written statement of a
witness who had died prior to trial. See Blithing, (1983) 77 Crim. App. 86, 89-
90. The panel held that the witness's statements were central to the prosecu-
tion, and that there were numerous important matters on which the defendant
would have liked to question him. See id.
232. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 23 (Eng.).
233. See id.; see also SPENCER, supra note 228, at 100 (noting that the 1988
Act broadened the ways in which a witness would be deemed unavailable). If
the documentary hearsay was prepared for the purpose of aiding a criminal
investigation or prosecution, leave of court was required for admission. See
Criminal Justice Act, 1988, § 26. Courts were to grant leave for admission only
if they believed admission would be "in the interests of justice." Id.
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make the admissibility of an unavailable witness's documenta-
ry hearsay contingent upon whether the defendant or his or her
attorney had been given a chance to cross-examine the decla-
rant prior to trial. Indeed, although the Act acknowledged trial
courts' power to refuse to admit documentary hearsay when ne-
cessary to serve "the interests of justice,"234 the Court of Appeal
explained in 1989 that a cross-examination opportunity was
not invariably essential. 235 If a trial judge concluded that the
defendant could controvert the unavailable witness's account
by means other than cross-examination, that the documentary
hearsay provided evidence of an apparently high quality, and
that the jury would respond appropriately to a reminder that
the defendant had never been given an opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant, then the documentary hearsay was to
be admitted, despite the fact that the declarant had never been
exposed to adverse questioning.236
Parliament entirely abolished the hearsay rule for civil
cases in 1995.237 England's Law Commission soon thereafter
undertook a review of the hearsay rule's application in criminal
cases, to see whether further changes were appropriate in that
domain as well.238 In 1997, the Law Commission issued its re-
port.239 The Law Commission had contemplated recommending
that Parliament abolish the hearsay rule entirely for criminal
cases, but feared that, among other things, the change would
bring England into conflict with the European Convention on
234. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, § 25(1); see also id. § 25(2) (listing discre-
tionary factors for courts to consider).
235. See R v. Cole, [1990) 2 All E.R. 108, 115-17 (1989); see also JENNY
McEwAN, EVIDENCE AND THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS 261 (2d ed. 1998) (stat-
ing that, under the 1988 Act, "judges must be wary of the argument that the
defence is disadvantaged by the inability to cross-examine the absent witness"
and that the prejudice resulting from the inability to cross-examine the wit-
ness must be especially strong in order to warrant excluding the documentary
hearsay).
236. See Cole, 2 All E.R. at 116-17.
237. See Civil Evidence Act, 1995, c. 38, § 1(1) (Eng.) ("In civil proceedings
evidence shall not be excluded on the ground that it is hearsay.").
238. See LAW COMM'N FOR ENG. & WALES, EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PRO-
CEEDINGS: HEARSAY AND RELATED TOPiCS, 1997, LAW COM No. 245 [hereinaf-
ter LAW COMMISSION]; see also PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMI-
NAL EVIDENCE 581 (2004) ("Prior to the advent of the Criminal Justice Act
2003, criticism of the law of hearsay had become so widespread and incessant
that one might doubt whether the rule against hearsay would, or should, sur-
vive in any form in English criminal proceedings.").
239. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 238.
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Human Rights (the ECHR),240 the substantive provisions of
which were slated to become enforceable in English courts in
October 2000.241
The ECHR provision about which the Law Commission
was concerned is Article 6(3)(d), which states that every person
charged with a crime in one of the member nations has the
right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him."24 2
The right to examine witnesses is among numerous rights that
Article 6 identifies; others include the right to be promptly in-
formed of prosecutors' formal allegations, the right to have am-
ple time to prepare a defense, the right to compel witnesses to
appear at trial, the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty, and the right to be given free legal representation if one
cannot afford to retain counsel and a court finds that "the in-
terests of justice" make counsel's assistance necessary. 243 When
reviewing claims under Article 6(3)(d), the European Court of
Human Rights (also known as the Strasbourg Court) has em-
phasized that it does not sit to pass judgment on the individual
evidentiary rulings of member nations' courts. 244 Rather, its
task is to ensure that, taken as a whole, each petitioner's crim-
inal proceeding was fair.24 5
240. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; I.H. DENNIS,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 695 (3d ed. 2007) (recounting this concern).
241. The ECHR became.enforceable in English courts pursuant to the Hu-
man Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), though its actual implementation was de-
layed. See id. § 22 (declaring that the relevant provisions of the 1998 Act
would come into force on a date designated by the Secretary of State); RI-
CHARD MAY & STEVEN POWLES, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 369 (5th ed. 2004) (stat-
ing that the relevant provisions became effective on October 2, 2000). Prior to
1998, English courts used the ECHR only for the purpose of helping to resolve
ambiguities in Parliament's legislation. Those persons in England who be-
lieved their ECHR rights had been violated had "to take the long and arduous
route of petitioning the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg."
MARTIN HANNIBAL & LISA MOUNTFORD, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
EVIDENCE 18 (2002). As a result of the 1998 Act, an English trial court today
must rule evidence inadmissible if its admission would violate the ECHR. See
MAY & POWLES, supra, at 369.
242. ECHR, supra note 240, § 6(3)(d).
243. See id. §§ 6(2)-(3).
244. See, e.g., Kostovski v. Netherlands, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 434, 447 (1989)
("It has to be recalled at the outset that the admissibility of evidence is pri-
marily a matter for regulation by national law. Again, as a general rule it is
for the national courts to assess the evidence before them."); see also MAY &
POWLES, supra note 241, at 381 (noting that the ECHR leaves to member na-
tions the task of identifying and adopting appropriate rules of evidence).
245. See, e.g., Kostouski, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 447 (stating that the European
Court's job is "to ascertain whether the proceedings considered as a whole, in-
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As construed by the Strasbourg Court, the opportunity to
cross-examine adverse witnesses is not invariably mandated by
Article 6, although it is one of the factors that a reviewing court
must consider when determining whether a defendant has re-
ceived a fair trial. When hearsay statements uttered by an un-
available witness were central to the prosecution's case and the
petitioner was never given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness prior to trial, the court is likely to rule that the peti-
tioner's trial was unfair and thus violated Article 6.246 The
court has said that prosecutors' reliance on hearsay uttered by
an unavailable witness is also problematic when the witness's
identity has been concealed from the petitioner, thus making it
more difficult for the petitioner to attack the witness's credibili-
ty by means other than cross-examination. 247 If an unavailable
witness's hearsay statements were corroborated by other evi-
dence and the witness's identity was known to the petitioner at
the time of trial, however, the Strasbourg Court would be likely
to hold that the petitioner's trial met the fairness requirements
of Article 6.248
cluding the way in which evidence was taken, were fair").
246. See, e.g., Luch v. Italy, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 807, 816 (2001) ("[W]here a
conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been
made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to
have examined . . . the rights of the defence are restricted to an extent that is
incompatible with the guarantees provided by Art. 6."); Saidi v. France, 17
Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 269-70 (1993) (holding that the petitioner's trial was unfair
because "neither at the stage of the investigation nor during the trial was the
applicant able to examine or have examined the witnesses concerned," despite
the fact that those witnesses' statements were the prosecution's sole evidence);
Delta v. France, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 574, 587 (1990) (holding that the petitioner's
trial was unfair because "neither the applicant nor his counsel ever had an
adequate opportunity to examine witnesses whose" statements were the sole
evidence on which the prosecution relied); Bricmont v. Belgium, 12 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 217, 240-41 (1989) (holding that the petitioner's trial was unfair because
the petitioner never had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on
whose testimony the prosecution primarily relied); Unterpertinger v. Austria,
13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 184 (1986) (holding that the petitioner's trial was unfair
because the conviction was based "mainly" on statements by declarants whom
the petitioner had never been given an opportunity to cross-examine).
247. See, e.g., Kostouski, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 448 ("If the defence is unaware
of the identity of the person it seeks to question, it may be deprived of the very
particulars enabling it to demonstrate that he or she is prejudiced, hostile or
unreliable.... The dangers inherent in such a situation are obvious.").
248. See, e.g., Ferrantelli v. Italy, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 937, 950-51 (find-
ing no violation of Article 6 because the declarant's statements were corrobo-
rated by other evidence and because the prosecution was not responsible for
the fact that the declarant had died prior to trial); Asch v. Austria, 15 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 597, 606-07 (1991) (distinguishing prior cases on similar grounds and
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Perhaps most interesting for our purposes here is the
Strasbourg Court's conclusion that pro se cross-examination
opportunities can be sufficient to satisfy Article 6-a conclusion
that is not surprising, given that the court is sometimes willing
to deem trials fair when there has been no cross-examination
opportunity at all. The court's leading case on the matter is
Isgr6 u. Italy.249 After Salvatore Isgr6 was arrested for kidnap-
ping and murder, Isgr6 and his primary accuser (a witness
identified by the court as Mr. D.) were brought before an inves-
tigating judge for questioning.250 During that proceeding-at
which Isgr6 was unrepresented by counsel-Isgr6 and Mr. D.
engaged in a verbal exchange, challenging one another's ac-
counts and accusing one another of lying.251 When Mr. D.. could
not be located to testify at trial, the trial court admitted into
evidence a transcript of Mr. D.'s statements before the investi-
gating judge.252 Following his conviction, Isgr6 appealed to the
Strasbourg Court, arguing that the transcript's admission ren-
dered his trial unfair in violation of Article 6. He argued that,
although he had been given a pro se opportunity to question
Mr. D., his attorney had never been given that same opportuni-
ty.25 3 The court unanimously rejected Isgr6's argument and
upheld his conviction.254 The court found that Mr. D.'s identity
was known and so Isgr6 was able to attack his credibility at
trial; Mr. D.'s statements were not the prosecution's sole evi-
dence of guilt; Isgr6 himself had been given an opportunity to
question Mr. D.; and the absence of Isgr6's attorney at the pre-
trial proceeding was counterbalanced by the fact that the pros-
ecuting attorney was also absent at that proceeding and by the
fact that Isgr6's attorney had an opportunity to criticize Mr.
D.'s statements and credibility at trial.2 5 5
holding that the petitioner's trial comported with the requirements of Article
6).
249. 194 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 2 (1991).
250. See id. at 7.
251. See id. at 8.
252. See id. at 9.
253. See id. at 11.
254. See id. at 13.
255. See id. The Strasbourg Court's conclusion is buttressed by the lan-
guage of Article 6(3)(d), which speaks of a defendant's opportunity "to examine
or have examined witnesses against him." See supra note 242 and accompany-
ing text. That phrasing is aimed at encompassing questioning by the defen-
dant himself or herself, by the defendant's attorney, or by a judicial officer. See
SPENCER, supra note 228, at 45 (discussing the wording of Article 6(3)(d)).
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After studying its obligations under Article 6 of the ECHR,
England's Law Commission sent proposed legislation to Par-
liament, which in turn responded with the 2003 Criminal Jus-
tice Act.2 56 The 2003 Act took the core provisions of the 1988
Act regarding documentary hearsay from unavailable wit-
nesses and expanded them to include all hearsay, whether
written or oral.2 5 7 Parliament also broadened still further the
circumstances in which a witness may be deemed unavailable
to testify at trial.2 5 8 In England today, oral and written hearsay
statements made by an unavailable witness are admissible in a
criminal trial-regardless of whether the defendant or his or
her attorney ever had an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness-if the witness is unavailable to testify at trial due to
death, physical or mental illness, absence from the United
Kingdom under conditions making it impracticable to return,
disappearance despite reasonable efforts to locate the witness,
or fear of recrimination that might flow from testifying against
the defendant. 259
Parliament aimed to reconcile those provisions with Article
6 of the ECHR in two ways. First, Parliament reiterated that a
trial judge has the discretion to exclude the absent witness's
hearsay statements if the judge believes that admitting the
evidence would render the defendant's trial unfair. 260 The Law
Commission had indicated that an exercise of such discretion
256. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.); see also SPENCER, supra
note 228, at 28-34 (discussing the relationship between the Law Commission's
1997 report and Parliament's enactment of the 2003 Act).
257. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 116(1); Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c.
35, § 23(1) (Eng).
258. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 116(2); Criminal Justice Act, 1988,
§ 23(2).
259. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 116(1)-(2). If the witness is unavail-
able due to his or her fear of testifying against the defendant, admission of the
witness's hearsay statements is not automatic-leave of the court is required.
See id. § 116(2)(e)-(4). For all other varieties of unavailability, leave of the
court is not required for admission. See DENNIS, supra note 240, at 705-06,
708.
260. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 126(2) (incorporating by reference
provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984); Police and Criminal
Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78(1) (Eng.) (allowing a court to exclude evidence
proffered by the prosecution after considering "all the circumstances, including
the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, . . . [if] the admission
of the evidence would have . . . an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceed-
ing"). A judge may also exclude an unavailable witness's hearsay statements
under the 2003 Act if the judge believes that the evidence's minimal probative
value would render admission an "undue waste of time." Criminal Justice Act,
2003, § 126(1).
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would be appropriate if, for example, the absent witness's hear-
say statements were the prosecution's primary evidence of the
defendant's guilt.2 61 Second, Parliament authorized the admis-
sion of hearsay statements under the 2003 Act only in those in-
stances in which the declarant "is identified to the court's satis-
faction," thereby enabling the defendant to attack the
declarant's credibility at trial.26 2
When American judges look to modern English courts for
guidance about the common law traditions that England be-
queathed to the United States, therefore, they will find that
their English counterparts have never regarded counsel's assis-
tance with pretrial cross-examinations as invariably essential,
and actually have evolved to a point where unavailable wit-
nesses' oral and written hearsay statements often are admitted
in the absence of any cross-examination whatsoever. 263 While
criminal defendants in the United States surely will contend
that pretrial cross-examination opportunities are constitution-
ally insufficient if the defendants are unrepresented by counsel,
defendants in England may count themselves as fortunate if
they are given any opportunity to question their accusers at all.
When defendants in the United States argue that the
freestanding Due Process Clause always assures them of the
right to an attorney's assistance with pretrial cross-
examinations, they thus are likely to be disappointed by the
courts' response. The Confrontation Clause and the Assistance
of Counsel Clause speak far more directly to defendants' con-
cerns, yet stop short of invariably guaranteeing them the right
to an attorney's aid; the Supreme Court's due process analysis
places great weight on Anglo-American traditions that plainly
regarded pro se cross-examination opportunities as sufficient;
contemporary practices in the United States shed little light on
the matter, given that it has been nearly half a century since
American jurisdictions enjoyed any flexibility; and English
courts have never construed their common law traditions as
demanding that criminal defendants always be guaranteed the
261. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 238, at 65 (noting that evidence
from an unidentified source "should not found a conviction if it stands alone").
262. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 116(1)(b); see also LAW COMMISSION, su-
pra note 238, at 95 (explaining that this requirement was deemed appropriate
in order to ensure compliance with the ECHR).
263. See supra Part L.A (outlining early English common law); supra notes
225-36, 256-62 and accompanying text (describing modern English hearsay
doctrine).
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assistance of counsel when cross-examining witnesses prior to
trial.
4. Promising Lines of Argument That Remain
Although the Due Process Clause does not invariably de-
mand that defendants be aided by attorneys when questioning
witnesses in advance of trial, a defendant still may argue that,
given the unique features of his or her case, counsel's assis-
tance is constitutionally required. There may be occasions, in
other words, when a defendant's special circumstances are such
that admitting the hearsay statements of an unavailable wit-
ness whom only the defendant himself or herself has had an
opportunity to cross-examine would "violate[] those fundamen-
tal conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and
political institutions ... and which define the community's
sense of fair play and decency."264 Of course, it is not possible to
catalogue all of those circumstances in advance-the analysis is
too fact intensive to permit one to describe ex ante all of the in-
stances in which relying on pro se cross-examination opportuni-
ties might be deemed fundamentally unfair under the Court's
due process framework. Consider, however, the following illu-
strative examples.
a. Mental Incompetence
A pretrial cross-examination opportunity ought to satisfy
the Due Process Clause's requirements only if, at the time the
opportunity is afforded, the defendant would be deemed men-
tally competent to represent himself or herself at trial.
The degree of mental competence required merely to stand
trial when represented by counsel is well established. More
than thirty years ago, in Drope v. Missouri,265 the Court ob-
served that "[iut has long been accepted that a person whose
mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to under-
stand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense
may not be subjected to trial."2 6 6 Insisting that this standard be
264. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,
790 (1977)).
265. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
266. Id. at 171; accord Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)
(per curiam) ("[T]he test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
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met, wrote the Court, "is fundamental to an adversary system
of justice." 2 67 In its 1993 decision in Godinez v. Moran,268 the
Court held that the Constitution prescribes the same compe-
tence standard for determining whether a person is mentally fit
to enter a plea of guilty or waive his or her right to counsel.269
Deciding whether to plead guilty or waive one's right to legal
representation, the Court found, does not require "an apprecia-
bly higher level of mental functioning" than making the deci-
sions one ordinarily must make in consultation with one's at-
torney during the course of a criminal trial.270 The Court
emphasized, however, that "the competence that is required of
a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the compe-
tence to waive the right, not the competence to represent him-
self."2 7 1 After all, when deciding whether to waive his or her
right to counsel, a defendant can speak with an attorney about
the pros and cons of going to trial pro se, and then make an in-
formed decision-a scenario quite different from the scenarios
that defendants encounter when they appear at trial without
counsel and have to make important decisions on their own.
The Godinez Court did not need to consider how a state
could proceed when it concludes that a defendant is fit to stand
trial if represented by counsel, but is not fit to go to trial pro se.
The Court recently addressed that question in Indiana v. Ed-
wards,272 where it distinguished between the degree of mental
competence required for a defendant to stand trial when
represented by counsel and the degree of mental competence
required for a defendant to proceed to trial pro se. 2 7 3 The Court
noted that, although defendants do have a Sixth Amendment
right to represent themselves at trial, 2 7 4 that right is not abso-
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understand-
ing of the proceedings against him." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
267. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172; see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966) ("[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent
violates due process . . . .").
268. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
269. See id. at 391 ("This case presents the question whether the compe-
tency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher
than the competency standard for standing trial. We hold that it is not.").
270. Id. at 399.
271. Id.
272. 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
273. See id. at 2385-88.
274. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975) ("To thrust counsel
upon the accused, against his considered wish . . . violates the logic of the
[Sixth] Amendment."); see also id. ("The counsel provision .... speaks of the
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lute.2 7 5 The fact that a defendant is mentally competent to
stand trial when assisted by an attorney does not mean that he
or she is mentally fit to take on the burden of defending himself
or herself. 276 As the American Psychiatric Association pointed
out in its amicus brief, "[a]n individual can be competent for
one purpose and not another."277 The Court thus held that "the
Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by
counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under
[Drope], but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the
point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings
by themselves." 278
The Edwards Court did not identify the precise standard
that state and federal authorities should use when assessing a
defendant's mental competence to go to trial alone.2 7 9 Instead,
the Court gave the nation's legislators and judges-at least for
the time being-the freedom to fashion appropriate standards
on their own. 2 8 0 Whatever those standards prove to be, it is
clear that they must measure a defendant's mental capacity to
'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.
The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that coun-
sel .... shall be an aid to a willing defendant . . . ."); Adams v. United States,
317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) ("[T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a
defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.").
275. See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2384 ("[T]he right of self-representation is
not absolute.").
276. See id. at 2386-88 (detailing the precedential, practical, and ethical
reasons for differentiating between these types of fitness).
277. Brief for The American Psychiatric Ass'n & American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18,
Edwards, 128 S. Ct, 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208) [hereinafter Brief for Am. Psy-
chiatric Ass'n]; see also id. at 20 ("Greater capabilities are generally required
to play the role of lawyer than of represented defendant. . . . [A] pro se defen-
dant is generally called on to do significantly more than a represented defen-
dant."); id. at 26 ("Disorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and
concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symp-
toms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant's ability to play the
significantly expanded role required for self-representation even if he can play
the lesser role of represented defendant.").
278. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2388.
279. See id. (declining Indiana's request for the Court to declare a federal
constitutional standard for determining mental competence to represent one-
self); see also id. at 2394 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's holding is extraordi-
narily vague.... We will presumably give some meaning to this holding in the
future, but the indeterminacy makes a bad holding worse.").
280. Cf. id. at 2388 (majority opinion) (noting c*onstitutional permission for
states to require representation, presumably according to standards deter-
mined by the states).
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perform numerous different functions. As the Court has pre-
viously acknowledged, a pro se defendant ordinarily must try
"to control the organization and content of his own defense, to
make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire,
to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at
appropriate points in the trial."2 81 With respect to interrogating
adverse witnesses, the American Psychiatric Association has
pointed out that an unrepresented defendant must be able "to
define and then pursue lines of cross-examination that show
genuine weaknesses or gaps in particular prosecution wit-
nesses' testimony; to see difficulties in the prosecution's evi-
dence and then ask the right questions."282
The time at which a defendant is given an opportunity to
interrogate a witness-whether at trial or before-has no bear-
ing on the degree of mental competence required to interrogate
the witness in a meaningful fashion. It is the nature of the task
that determines the degree of mental competence required to
perform it, not the date on which the task must be performed.
If it offends our historically grounded sense of fundamental
fairness to permit defendants to cross-examine witnesses on
their own at trial when they lack the mental competence neces-
sary for the task, then it undoubtedly offends those same sensi-
bilities to admit into evidence the testimonial statements of an
unavailable witness whom only an incompetent defendant was
given a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine. 283
b. Language Barriers
Like mental incompetence, language barriers can preclude
meaningful communication between an unrepresented defen-
dant and a witness whom he or she is attempting to confront. It
thus would surely violate our "fundamental conceptions of jus-
tice"284 to admit into evidence the hearsay statements of an un-
available witness, whom only the defendant has had an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine, if the defendant was not capable of
281. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984).
282. Brief for American Psychiatric Ass'n, supra note 277, at 24.
283. Cf. R v. Peacock, (1870) 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 21, 22 (N. Cir.) (noting a
common law presumption that if a defendant is personally present at a deposi-
tion then he or she has been afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent, but noting that the presumption can be overcome, such
as by evidence that the defendant was not mentally fit to interrogate the wit-
ness).
284. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) (quoting United
States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).
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competently communicating in the language spoken by the
witness and no interpreter was provided to facilitate the com-
munication.
The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the
Due Process Clause demands that state and federal authorities
provide interpreters in order to enable non-English-speaking
criminal defendants to participate meaningfully in their tri-
als.285 Lower federal courts have held, however, that it does. In
Negron v. New York, 2 8 6 the seminal case on the matter, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the trial of a
non-English-speaking defendant "lacked the basic and funda-
mental fairness required by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment," because no interpreter was provided and
the language barrier rendered the defendant unable "to partic-
ipate effectively in his own defense."287 While noting that the
absence of an interpreter also impinged upon the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to participate in his attorney's cross-
examination of adverse witnesses, the court concluded that the
due process concerns were "even more consequential."288 "[A]s a
matter of simple humaneness," wrote the court, the defendant
"deserved more than to sit in total incomprehension as the trial
proceeded." 289 In the judgment of the Second Circuit, the defen-
dant's inability to speak English was just "as debilitating to his
285. See United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The
United States Supreme Court has yet to recognize the right to a court-
appointed interpreter as a constitutional one."). But cf. The Japanese Immi-
grant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1903) (holding that the Due Process Clause
does not require that an interpreter be provided to aliens in civil immigration
proceedings); United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that the Court's holding in the Japanese Immigrant Case is not dispo-
sitive in criminal cases). The Court's silence on the constitutional issue in re-
cent years is due in part to Congress's enactment in 1978 of the Court Inter-
preters Act, which eased some of the pressure to address the constitutional
implications of denying defendants the use of interpreters. See Pub. L. No. 95-
539, 92 Stat. 2040 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1827-28
(2006)). In that legislation, Congress declared that an interpreter should be
made available in both civil and criminal cases when a party or witness
"speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language." 28
U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(A). Although § 1827 has made the use of interpreters
commonplace in judicial proceedings, it does not purport to reach interviews
by law enforcement officials in the early stages of a criminal investigation.
286. 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
287. Id. at 389.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 390.
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ability to participate in the trial as a mental disease or de-
fect."290
Other courts have reached comparable conclusions. The
First Circuit has explained, for example, that "[t]he right to an
interpreter rests most fundamentally. . . on the notion that no
defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an incompre-
hensible ritual which may terminate in punishment."291 The
Seventh Circuit has held that "a defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding is denied due process when. . . what is told him is in-
comprehensible ... or ... a credible claim of incapacity to un-
derstand due to language difficulty is made and the district
court fails to [respond appropriately]."292 The Ninth Circuit has
acknowledged that, "[i]n a judicial proceeding where a defen-
dant lacks the ability to speak or understand English, an inter-
preter can be essential for ensuring a fair trial."2 9 3 Because de-
ciding whether an interpreter is warranted involves weighing a
variety of factors-such as the sophistication of the vocabulary
that the trial will entail, the ability of the defendant's attorney
to communicate in the defendant's native language, and the
economic and practical implications of retaining an interpre-
ter's services-appellate courts have said that trial judges enjoy
broad discretion to determine whether an interpreter is essen-
tial in a particular case. 2 9 4 But when an interpreter is indeed
necessary to facilitate essential communication between a de-
fendant and those participating in his or her trial, the Due
Process Clause requires that an interpreter be provided.
Precisely those same due process concerns arise when a
non-English-speaking defendant is given an opportunity to
290. Id.
291. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 907 (1974).
292. United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1985); accord
United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming that a
defendant's constitutional "right to communicate with his or her counsel" may
necessitate the aid of an interpreter).
293. United States v. Si, 333 F.3d 1041, 1042 (9th Cir. 2003).
294. See, e.g., id. at 1043-44 & n.3 (noting that this is a matter generally
committed to the discretion of the trial court); United States v. Bennett, 848
F.2d 1134, 1141 (11th Cir. 1988) ("As a constitutional matter the appointment
of interpreters is within the district court's discretion."); United States v. Mar-
tinez, 616 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1980) , cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981)
("The use of courtroom interpreters involves a balancing of the defendant's
constitutional rights to confrontation and due process against the public's in-
terest in the economical administration of criminal law."); Carrion, 488 F.2d at
14 (noting some of the factors a trial court must consider in making this de-
termination).
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cross-examine a witness prior to trial. Just as the Due Process
Clause is implicated when defendants' mental incompetence
renders them unable to interrogate witnesses effectively,295 So
too can language impediments render a cross-examination op-
portunity meaningless, regardless of when that opportunity is
afforded. It does not matter whether a defendant's incapacities
are mental or linguistic in nature-both raise profound fairness
concerns in our adversarial system of justice. It thus is consti-
tutionally imperative either that the defendant be competent in
the witness's language or that an interpreter be provided to as-
sist. If neither of those requirements has been met, it would be
fundamentally unfair to admit the witness's hearsay state-
ments into evidence on the strength of the argument that the
defendant was given a chance to interrogate the witness prior
to trial.
c. Perfect Storms
Although the outcomes in such cases are difficult to predict
with any measure of certainty, defendants ought to be alert to
the possibility of persuading a court that particular groupings
of factors render a pro se cross-examination opportunity consti-
tutionally worthless. Even if each of those factors standing
alone might be innocuous under the Court's due process
framework, a court might nevertheless regard the accumula-
tion of factors in a given case as akin to a "perfect storm" 2 9 6 SUf-
ficient to bring the Due Process Clause into play.
Consider, once again, our counterparts across the Atlantic.
Modern English courts (when discussing judges' common law
discretion to exclude hearsay on grounds of fairness) and the
Strasbourg Court (when reviewing claims of unfairness under
Article 6 of the ECHR) have identified numerous factors that
bear on the fairness of admitting the hearsay statements of an
unavailable witness who either has never been cross-examined
by anyone at all or has only been cross-examined by an unre-
presented defendant.297 If one were to imagine an American
case in which multiple such factors were at play, it might look
295. See supra notes 265-83 and accompanying text (discussing mental in-
competence).
296. See generally SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM 149-50 (1997)
(using the term to denote a tremendous storm caused by the confluence of me-
teorological events that, taken individually, would be far less consequential).
297. See supra notes 238-62 and accompanying text (discussing develop-
ments in England and Europe).
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something like this: imagine a case in which the unavailable
witness's hearsay statements are the sole evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt, there are numerous important questions that
defense counsel would have liked to ask the witness, and prose-
cuting attorneys were present when the unrepresented defen-
dant was given his or her pretrial cross-examination opportuni-
ty (thereby skewing the psychological dynamics even more
powerfully against the defendant). On grounds of fairness, the
Strasbourg and English courts would likely hold that the wit-
ness's hearsay statements were inadmissible. There is no rea-
son to believe that the result ought to be different in the United
States.
Of course, line-drawing questions predictably arise. How
many such factors must be present in order to render the hear-
say statements inadmissible? What if the hearsay statements
are not the sole evidence of the defendant's guilt, but they nev-
ertheless rest at the heart of the prosecution's case? What if the
defendant actually did quite a good job of cross-examining the
witness prior to trial on his or her own, such that there are only
a few additional matters that defense counsel would have liked
to explore? These are challenging questions, to be sure, but
their difficulty should not preclude courts from developing a
due process regime that begins to answer them.
CONCLUSION
Because the Supreme Court has securely yoked its confron-
tation jurisprudence to eighteenth-century common law author-
ities, the Confrontation Clause no longer assures a criminal de-
fendant that an unavailable witness's testimonial hearsay
statements will be inadmissible at trial unless the defendant
was given a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine the witness
with the aid of an attorney. Although a pretrial cross-
examination opportunity is essential if the prosecution wishes
to introduce the unavailable witness's testimonial statements
into evidence, the Confrontation Clause is now satisfied if that
opportunity is afforded to the unrepresented defendant
alone. 298 Unless the Court shifts course yet again, defendants
seeking an attorney's help with pretrial cross-examinations
must now stake their hopes on the Sixth Amendment's Assis-
tance of Counsel Clause and the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
298. See supra Parts I & II.A.
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Taking those provisions together, one can make the follow-
ing claims concerning the nexus between defendants' confron-
tation and counsel rights in cases in which a hearsay declarant
is unavailable to testify at trial. First, if the defendant was giv-
en an opportunity to cross-examine the witness after the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached, then the
witness's hearsay statements are inadmissible unless the de-
fendant was permitted to conduct the cross-examination with
counsel's assistance. 299 Second, if the cross-examination oppor-
tunity was afforded before the defendant's right to counsel at-
tached, but the witness was still available to testify at the time
attachment occurred, then the Constitution ought to be inter-
preted to allow the defendant's attorney to request an opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witness, and the witness's hearsay
statements ought to be inadmissible at trial if that request is
refused. 300 Third, if the cross-examination opportunity was af-
forded before the defendant's right to counsel attached and the
witness had already become unavailable to testify by the time
attachment occurred, then the witness's hearsay statements
are admissible at trial,301 unless the defendant can raise a due
process objection based upon the defendant's mental incompe-
tence, the defendant's inability to speak the witness's language,
or some other extraordinary state of affairs. 302
In cases in which law enforcement officials fear that a wit-
ness will die or become otherwise unavailable to testify, there-
fore, those officials have a strong incentive to afford the defen-
dant an early opportunity to interrogate the witness. Officials
can thereby lay the groundwork for arguing that the Confron-
tation Clause poses no obstacle if the witness becomes unavail-
able to testify and prosecutors wish to introduce the witness's
testimonial hearsay statements into evidence. Although there
will be cases in which the Assistance of Counsel and Due
Process Clauses will preclude the hearsay statements' admis-
sion unless the defendant was given an opportunity to question
the witness with counsel's help, there will be many instances in
which pro se cross-examination opportunities are constitution-
ally sufficient.
Those who regard pro se cross-examinations as an unac-
ceptable proxy for cross-examinations by trained attorneys can
299. See supra Part II.B.1.
300. See supra Part II.B.2.
301. See supra Part II.B.2.
302. See supra Part III.B.4.
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proceed in either of two ways. First, they can try to persuade
the Supreme Court to alter its confrontation, right-to-counsel,
or due process jurisprudence, such that defendants will inevit-
ably be guaranteed the assistance of an attorney when cross-
examining witnesses prior to trial. It is difficult to be optimistic
about that approach's success (at least in the short term), how-
ever, given the Court's clear and repeated insistence in recent
years that the Confrontation Clause must be interpreted in
conformance with eighteenth-century common law authorities,
and given the well-established nature of the Court's frame-
works for adjudicating right-to-counsel and due process claims.
Second, those troubled by the new constitutional state of
affairs can focus on launching legislative initiatives at the state
and federal levels aimed at compensating for the Constitution's
gaps. If one believes that pro se cross-examination opportuni-
ties are inadequate to vindicate defendants' confrontation
rights, then one can try to persuade the nation's lawmakers to
enact laws embodying that judgment. After all, our evidentiary
codes already declare numerous varieties of evidence inadmis-
sible on the strength of fairness, reliability, or other public-
policy concerns, even though the Constitution itself would pose
no obstacle to the evidence's admission. 303 In light of the
Court's recent reappraisal of the Confrontation Clause, it may
be time for the nation's various jurisdictions to adopt eviden-
tiary rules barring the admission of an unavailable witness's
testimonial hearsay statements unless the defendant has been
given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness with the as-
sistance of counsel.
303. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting the exclusion of relevant evi-
dence when it poses a substantial risk of "unfair prejudice"); id. 407 (requiring,
in specified circumstances, the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures); id. 412 (requiring, in specified circumstances, the exclusion of cer-
tain kinds of evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct).
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